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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes Iran-Saudi relations in the context of growing regional
hostility. This research encompasses the domestic and foreign policies enacted by both
states since 1979, accompanying a discussion of the historical background of their ties.
Moreover, the future prospects of their relations regarding the utilization of Oman as a
neutral negotiator for regional conflicts are examined. The significant contributing factors
of each state to such dynamic ties include: the leadership, national security, religionpolitics connection, and their reaction to global instability indicators. Recently, IranSaudi hostility has been worsening due to their policies in the region in reaction to
regional events. Thus, some may argue that the outlook of success for Omani role in
negotiating between the two is seemingly less likely. The relations of these two Persian
Gulf regional powers need to be examined further for future prospects.
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INTRODUCTION
The unfriendly relations between the Iranian government and the Saudi regime have
dated back for hundreds of years. However, the Sunni-Shi’ite schism dates back much farther;
beginning within the 7th century. 1 The significance in studying the differences in the religious
and governmental aspects of these two states lies in the power play that happens inside of the
Persian Gulf region. This power struggle has been occurring since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 2
Even in times of crises, where national interests align among the Saudi and Iranian governments,
cooperation seems to not be an answer. This research investigates the factors that contribute to
the worsening of relations, the implications of Iran-Saudi disunity on regional events, and the
possibilities for utilizing Oman as a neutral negotiator.
Background
The turbulent relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be traced back throughout
political history. Some scholars suggest that there is more to this turmoil than merely disunity
between two states, but rather a schism of one religion: Islam. The religious majority in Iran
identifies with the Shi’a branch of Islam. In Saudi Arabia the majority of the Muslim population
is known to be Sunni Muslim—the larger sect of Islam. While this century old disunion might
seem insignificant after years of healing, the disparity between the Shi’a community and the
Sunni community has possibly transferred over into forming fundamental gaps between states.
Thus, religious disunity has the potential to be considered a contributing factor towards IranSaudi hostility.
However, religious disunity isn’t the only factor that needs to be investigated throughout
this research. Since the Arab Spring uprisings, regimes across the entire region have been
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plagued with instability. This has resulted in an influx of states making foreign and domestic
policy changes that are intended to combat the instability. Of these states, Iran and Saudi Arabia
tend to be categorized as the more active ones, which might be attributable to their growing
influence within the region. When the Iranian and Saudi states engage in dialogue with falling
regimes, it is quite common for these two governments to develop and act upon opposing views.
In this sense, the opposing policies seem to be effecting and possibly adding to the hostility
between the two states. In any such instance, differing ideologies have not been noted as
assisting in the warming of Iran-Saudi relations.
Furthermore, because the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia are based upon Islamic
law, it is not ideal to attempt to separate policies from Islamic ideology throughout this research.
The schism between Sunnis and Shi’ites might not be the only contributing factor. However, the
differing of religious ideology in regards to the way in which each state governs its people
cannot be ignored. Therefore, the lack of consensus regarding religion as well as political matters
appears to contribute to the dynamic Iran-Saudi relations.
Variables
The intention of this research is to discuss the extent to which differing domestic and
foreign policies effects the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Over the course of this
investigation it was found that due to the substantial amount of information the variables would
have to be subdivided in order for more comprehensive research to be conducted. This approach
has yielded variables within the general categories of: domestic policies and foreign policies.
This research also led to understanding of a variable that affects the policies and therefore could
potential affect Iran-Saudi relations: Islam. This discussion intends to study the policies of each
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state in the way that they are enacted. Thus, research has been conducted regarding: religion,
politics, and the way that these factors interact with one another.
Religion-Politics
One potential contributing factor regarding Iran-Saudi dynamic relations is the schism
between the two central sects of Islam—the Sunni and Shi’a branch. There are said to be more
Sunni Muslims than Shi’a Muslims in the world and this especially rings true in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, where Sunnis represent between 85 and 90 percent of the Muslim population. 3 On
the other hand, in Iran, while the majority of the population is Muslim like in Saudi Arabia, the
ratio of Sunni Muslims and Shi’ite Muslims stands in stark contrast to the data retrieved from
Saudi Arabia. In Iran, approximately 90 to 95 percent of the Muslim population has identified
themselves with the Shi’a branch of Islam. 4
While it is significant to note and understand the differences between the general
populations of both states in terms of religious preferences, another aspect of the religious
schism between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the divide between these two states based on of
different styles of governance. For instance within Saudi Arabia, the government follows a strict
Wahhabi code of law which has been cited as restricted the way in which Saudi society
fundamentally functions. 5 While in Iran, the citizens are not subjected to following this strict
form of law. 6 There are many differences between both countries regarding societal function, but
it is important to note that this research intends to study these dissimilarities to the extent that
any such investigation assists in displaying the effect that the examined policies have on IranSaudi relations. Thus, religion will be discussed merely in comparative terms regarding the
politics of Islamic implementation of each state.
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Domestic Policies
Another possible explanation for the dynamic Iran-Saudi ties is due in part by the
domestic political actions taken by each state. Since Iran and Saudi Arabia are situated across
from each other, with the Persian Gulf acting as a natural separator, the domestic policies of each
state could have a substantial impact on the other. This could potentially account for the
progression of Iran-Saudi relations.
For instance, when the Iranian Islamic Revolution began in 1979, the Saudi government
was not exactly pleased with the thought of revolutionary ideas spreading throughout the Persian
Gulf region. These ideas could eventually threaten the very existence of the Saudi monarchy,
educational systems, and Wahhabi movement. 7
More recently, Iran has decided to pursue the development of nuclear technology. This
has created discussion throughout the entire international community, and the Saudi state has
been particularly vocal and active in reference to the opposition of a nuclear-armed Iran. When
Saudi military expenditures are studied, the security dilemma unraveling between these two
states becomes even more recognizable. The Saudi government has been cited as hiking up its
military budget to about $80.8 billion, which is about 10 percent of its annual GDP, making the
Saudi military the fourth most expensive military in the world. 8
The differing of policy choices has the potential to be perceived as offensive to each
state. It is unfeasible to attempt to investigate every policy that each state produces. Therefore,
the domestic policies included in this research have been chosen based upon the influential
nature of each policy. Those policies include: Tehran’s nuclear program and Riyadh’s internal
combat against Islamic radicals individuals. These policies will be discussed because they are not
only affecting the national environment, but are also cited as having an effect on Iran-Saudi
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affairs. Throughout the region, states are seeking accountability from Tehran and Riyadh in
accordance with these domestic decisions because these issues have spread beyond each state’s
own borders.
Foreign Policies
The foreign policies pursued by the Iranian and Saudi governments have potentially
affected the status quo of regional relations. Throughout the course of this research, it was found
that both states tend to become immersed within regional affairs and this is due in part by the
influential nature of each state. Throughout some recent regional conflicts, Tehran and Riyadh
have developed and acted upon opposing beliefs. Therefore, a potential cause for the dynamic
Iran-Saudi relations are the foreign policies that each state pursues.
Recently, this lack of unity over foreign policy choices is epitomized by the events and
actions taken place in regards to the Syrian Civil War. While Iranian Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei insists on aiding Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
and his successor King Salman have been adamant about seeing the demise of al-Assad’s rule.
Key differences--such as this--between two incredibly vocal and prominent states in a
progressing region are potential causes for unsteady Iran-Saudi ties.
Relationship
To fully understand the dysfunctional ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is imperative
to study each major factor influencing this relationship. Thus, as discussed previously, the
varying factors being analyzed within this research are the influence of Islam within Saudi
Arabia and Iran, and the domestic and foreign policies within these states. The causal factor
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under examination is Iran-Saudi ties. Thus, the general outline of the main variable categories
from this research suggests that the correlations between the variables are as followed:

Figure 1: Wide-ranging relationship chart showing that the religious ideology within each state acts as an
antecedent variable and affects the domestic and foreign policies which in turn affects the Iran-Saudi hostility

Moreover, for the sake of this discussion regarding the relationship between these three
primary variables, religious ideology enacted by the state is understood and accounted for
throughout the investigation of domestic and foreign policies. This research purports that the
examined domestic and foreign policies are factors that contribute to the dynamism of Iran-Saudi
relations. Thus, in some instances, the more committed the Iranian and Saudi regimes have
become to their respective and opposing policies, the nature of the ties between these two states
shift. Thus, the figures below depict the relationship between the specific areas of focus.
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Religion-Politics

Figure 2: Positive relationship between increase in governmental religious discrimination and the increase in
Iran-Saudi hostility

Domestic Policies

Figure 3: Positive relationship between increasing domestic security and increase in Iran-Saudi hostility

Foreign Policies

Figure 4: Shows a positive relationship between the increase in the individual efforts of each state and the
increase in hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia

Significance
Theoretical Importance
With the nuclear program at its peak in Iran, this state is aiming to gain influence and
political significance in a region where power seems to be in the hands of oil-rich nations. Trying
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to obtain this nuclear technology has come at a cost; tough sanctions have been imposed on Iran
and the favorable opinion of Iranian policy has seen a downward spiral throughout the Persian
Gulf region. Iranian foreign policy has not had a sense of focus on compromise in regards to
nuclear technology located in the country and this has created a buzz of anxiety throughout the
Middle East, especially in nations that are not friendly with Iran, like Saudi Arabia.
With the balance of power shifting or seeking to shift throughout the Gulf region, this
geographic area is in a period of instability; fostering national identity crises, vulnerabilities, and
extremism. It is imperative to understand and to therefore possibly facilitate improvement of the
dynamics between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is due to the opportunity for disunity between
these states to foster violence, more instability, and radicalism. This is represented through the
state of Syria—the Saudi monarchy has insisted that to dismantle al-Assad’s rule in Syria is of
the utmost national interest for Saudi Arabia, while the Iranian government has insisted on
keeping al-Assad’s regime alive. Due to the opposite stances regarding the Syrian Civil War, the
late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had refused to work alongside of Iranian Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei in order to combat the forces of ISIS. Although Saudi Arabia and Iran have the
same goal—to dismantle ISIS—these two states have chosen to not work with each other. King
Abdullah had made it very clear that if the United States worked with Iran in order to combat
ISIS, the friendly affairs between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would not
continue. This has left the United States in an uncomfortable situation—wanting to gain leverage
with a negotiating adversary while pleasing your largest Arab ally.
It is clear that a problem between two extremely influential Shi’ite and Sunni nations
exists. Religion throughout the region is a dominating aspect of life—Islam affects a multitude of
fundamentals of society from love and marriage, to wars and conflicts. In fact, the Islamic State
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has utilized the schism between Sunnis and Shi’ites as a recruitment tactic. If these two
influential Sunni and Shi’a states formed a bond against extremism and terrorism, the
recruitment tactics of ISIS would have no merit.
It is significant to ensure the safety of citizens throughout the world and this is focused in
nations that we call our allies. It is also important to note that conflicts between influential states
in a region that witnesses the demise of many instable regimes could lead to a man-made
disaster. This ongoing conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia should not persist as it does. Due
to the influence these two states have, if the Iran-Saudi conflict is solved, the relations can serve
as not only an example, but as a stabilizing agent throughout this region.
Policy Importance
Some scholars consider Iran and Saudi Arabia to be the biggest influencers of the Persian
Gulf region due to the geographic size of the two countries, the natural resources within each
country, and the persuasive nature of the governments. 9 Thus, while the bipolar essence of the
Gulf region had previously been managed, it is now beginning to see the commencement of a
violent climax. Saudi Arabia is considered to be a regional power due to massive oil reserves that
bring in billions in revenues, making this state one of the wealthiest Middle Eastern countries.
Due to the influence that oil money has on the 21st century world and the fact that the United
States and the Saudi regime have been longstanding allies, Saudi Arabia has always had an
incredible influence throughout the relations that are formulated inside and outside of the Persian
Gulf region.
Yet, in this region there is another large country that is beginning to seek more
influence—Iran. Throughout the process of nuclear negotiations, this state has been attempting to
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grasp influence wherever it finds possible. While the government is known to have the fourthlargest amounts of oil reserves in the world and is the third largest oil producer of the world,
international sanctions have made producing this oil another challenge altogether. This has left
the state and its citizens in poverty. 10 So, the Iranian government has begun to look for influence
in things that don’t revolve around oil or extreme wealth. International negotiations and
sanctions regarding Tehran’s nuclear system have potentially hindered the relationship between
negotiating states and those states’ allies. For instance, there had been a considerable amount of
opposition between Iran, the United States, and Saudi Arabia for the duration of nuclear
negotiations. Thus, the tension between Tehran and Washington at this time might not assist in
the efforts of rekindling the Saudi-Iran relationship and could potentially jeopardize US-Saudi
ties. In this instance, a neutral state could be utilized for conflict to diminish and negotiations to
produce admirable effects. The possibility of this neutral actor lies in a state that borders Saudi
Arabia and shares a body of water with Iran: Oman. The Omani government has had experience
as a negotiator with many states including Iran, which makes the possibility for the utilization of
Omani negotiating tactics plausible. So, while Iran-Saudi cooperation is hibernating, applying
regional neutrality into issue of concern could be the future of the Persian Gulf region. Thus, it is
practical to understand the split between these two states, understand the dynamics throughout
the Gulf region, and use this to benefit the citizens of this region.
Literature Review
In order to fully understand each state it is important to learn the foundations of Islam due
to each state’s implementation of Islam within its government. Also, studying the Islamic
Revolution of 1979 is significant because many scholars have sited this event as the turning point
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of Iran-Saudi relations. Within this chronological perspective, the Hajj will also be examined due
to its ability to elaborate on the focuses of this analysis: Islam and politics.
Islamic Roots
The importance of studying Saudi Arabia not only lies in this state’s contemporary
influence, but also within the examination of the Islamic roots that were established in this
country. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad whom was the messenger of
God and established the Islamic faith in order to establish unity throughout Arabia. This territory
was divided and fighting over lack of resources and a similar belief in Islam among the people
brought the society together. 11 However, this unity did not last forever and in 632 A.D., when the
Prophet had died, disagreements had begun over who would become the successor. While one
group of Muslims believed succession should be based on merit, the other believed it should be
based on bloodline. Thus, the schism between the Sunni and Shi’a branches of Islam were
formed respectively. 12
Islamic Revolution of 1979
The Islamic Revolution or Iranian Revolution of 1979 marked a turning point in Iran due
to modifications in the domestic and foreign political realities. After the fall of the Shah of Iran,
who instilled a more secular governmental system and had a good relationship with the United
States, Iran transformed into the Islamic Republic of Iran. 13 The leader of this revolution and the
subsequent Iranian government was Ruhollah Khomeini, who assumed the title of the Grand
Ayatollah. 14 The Islamic Revolution frightened the Saudi monarchy because the Saudi
government felt that revolutionary ideas might begin to seep into their borders. 15 What angered
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia about the Islamic Revolution was that the Grand Ayatollah expressed
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that Iran was the only pure Islamic state—this served as a direct threat to Fahd’s divine right to
rule. 16 After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the relations between Tehran and Riyadh never
fully healed. This is apparent in the succeeding events involving these two states.
The Hajj
However, in some instances, Tehran and Riyadh have attempted to peacefully connect
and find common ground. Islam connects almost every individual throughout the region. Thus, it
seems appropriate that one such instance in which the Iranian and Saudi regimes have attempted
to find common ground is through Islam. In Islam, one of the five pillars is called the Hajj, or the
pilgrimage. This is a journey to the Mecca that each Muslim is expected to do at least once in
their adult life in order to prove their commitment to God and Islam. 17 Mecca is located in Saudi
Arabia and on occasion, the Saudi government had instilled strict standards on those who could
make the Hajj, especially those traveling from Iran.
However, a change of policy was implemented after the Iran-Iraq War and during Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. While Riyadh had previously acted as a catalyst throughout the Iran-Iraq
War by supplying Saddam’s Iraq with airbases and money, King Fahd realized the true threat
was not the weak and war-torn Iran; it was the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. 18 Therefore, King Fahd
made attempts at normalizing relations with Tehran. So, in 1991 a notable peace effort came
forth with King Fahd’s allowing Iranians to make the pilgrimage and complete the Hajj. 19
This benefited Tehran in the sense that it made it possible for Iranian citizens to complete
the pillars of Islam and prove their commitment to God. It also pleased the Saudi state because
the pilgrimage brings in thousands of tourists each year and analysis has shown that this brings in
billions of dollars in revenue. 20 This was seen as a possible turning point in the foreign dynamics
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between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While there was fear that Iranians and Saudis would clash during
the annual Hajj, any type of conflict was quickly restrained and settled by Saudi officials. 21The
demonstrations that did occur were geared towards Israel and the United States, and anti-Saudi
chants were quickly stopped. 22 However, these amiable relations did not last long and the Iranian
and Saudi governments soon began to see years of division on key issues encompassing the
entire Middle Eastern region.
Recently, the issues dividing these two states have been surrounded around the nuclear
technology in Tehran, the policy choices of each state regarding al-Assad’s rule in Syria, and the
combat against Islamic extremism.
Nuclear Negotiations
In regards to the nuclear technology in Tehran, Riyadh has been very adamant on not
allowing Iran to gain access to nuclear weapons. In fact, some scholars have cited that Saudi
Arabia has funded other nuclear programs like those in Pakistan as a means of deterrence. 23 The
nuclear technology in Tehran has also led into some disagreements between the United States
and the Saudi Arabian government, where Saudi Arabia has felt that there is still much more that
can and should be done on behalf of the United States. 24 Friction between the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia is uncommon and would not be taken lightly. While the United States has a lot on the line
in respect to nuclear negotiations, the Saudi monarchy has even more riding on this issue due to
the close proximity of the two states and the hostile nature of the relations between Tehran and
Riyadh. Thus, the nuclear capabilities and policy choices that Iran has undertaken will not be
taken unconscientiously throughout the world, especially in the eyes of the Saudi government
whom only have a peripheral role throughout the entirety of nuclear negotiations.
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Syrian Civil War
Al-Assad and his secular regime in Syria have come to see a revolution that began during
the Arab Spring involving the citizens of Syria seeking to overthrow their president. Due to
geographical location, resources, and ideological values, the Civil War in Syria has been looked
at as an opportunity and outlet for other states to pursue their own national interests. 25 Of these
states, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been of discussion due to their influence throughout this
region. The Iranian government wished to strengthen al-Assad’s regime due to a history of close
diplomatic ties. 26 Iran has done extensive work involving strengthening the Syrian military, even
fighting alongside the military in some instances, and warding off the Islamic State, whom has
been attempting to gain complete power within Syria. 27 On the contrary, the Saudi Arabian
government has seen the Syrian Civil War in an opposite light and has been vocal about wanting
to see the demise of al-Assad’s secular rule. In his place, the government of Saudi Arabia is
hopeful for a different government, because Syria borders a Shi’ite Iraq, a non-ally of Saudi
Arabia. 28 This new government could potentially become an ally to Saudi Arabia and strengthen
their foothold in the region, while weakening Iran’s stance. Seeing the fall of al-Assad’s
government in Syria is one of the utmost national concerns for the Saudi government that the late
King Abdullah had spoken about on several occasions. In fact, Abdullah had said that the combat
against the Islamic State is less of a national interest than the instability in Syria. 29 The
disagreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the Syrian Revolution have been effected by
the stance that each state takes to combat Islamic extremism, and more specifically the
organization that labels itself as the Islamic State.
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Islamic Extremism
Although both Iran and Saudi Arabia have both agreed that fighting against the Islamic
State is of their national interests, they do not agree to fight side by side. 30 Iran had been one of
the first states to fight against ISIS, yet this state is not officially considered as one of the U.S.led coalition partners against ISIS. 31 This is potentially attributable to the fact that the Saudi
government has refused to allow Iran to officially join as a partner. 32 In fact, King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia had threatened to boycott the Paris Conferences regarding forming the coalition
against ISIS if Iranian representatives were going to be present. 33 This international crisis is one
to be studied because of its complexities—while both Iran and Saudi Arabia have national
interests aligned in bringing down the Islamic State, both states have drifted even further apart in
regards to this issue.
Literature Fit
This research is intended to understand the divide between Iran and Saudi Arabia on a
fundamental level and apply it throughout current regional affairs. This discussion is also
focused on modern instances of how each state’s dedication to specific policies and ideologies
has potentially resulted in contributions to dynamic relations. In essence, this research is focused
on the policies and current events that are contributing to the balance of power throughout the
Persian Gulf region, with respect to Iran and Saudi Arabia as the central influencers.
While there is much research that has been conducted about the tense nature of IranSaudi relations, there is little discussed about the importance and potential for improving upon
these relations, in respect to stabilizing the Gulf region. Furthermore, there is not a substantial
amount of research regarding the potential role that the Omani government could play
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throughout Iran-Saudi relations. So, this discussion will recognize this uneasy relationship as an
issue of this region from a contemporary context as well as establish a stance regarding the
neutrality of Oman. This discussion will also provide research that will benefit future analysis of
relations between these states.
There is hope that there will be potential negotiation tactics between these two unfriendly
states through the use of a neutral actor, such as Oman. While Oman has been utilized through
strategic cooperation before, there is still little research done on the triangular Iran-Saudi-Oman
relationship and the future prospects this holds. Therefore, this research will put forth an analysis
of past Omani-led negotiations and an investigation of the relations that the Omani government
has formulated with Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively. While the Iranian and Saudi case
studies are described in terms of their intrinsic value, the Omani case study will be discussed in
terms of the instrumental value that this state will play throughout Iran-Saudi relations. These
aspects of the research will assist in the establishment of prospects for the future regarding IranSaudi ties, with regards to Omani negotiation tactics.
Research Design
This research will have five segments; the first being an introductory chapter, the next
two sections will be the case studies of Saudi Arabia and Iran, in respect to the variables
discussed previously. The third segment is an analysis of Oman’s role as a negotiating entity. A
more detailed outline of this chapter will be discussed further. The final chapter of the research is
a discussion of the implications of the research, with a focus on the possibilities and prospects
for the future.
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The first case study in this research is a discussion on Saudi Arabia. Within this study
there will research regarding the religion of this country from a political perspective. The
methods in which the Saudi monarchy is attempting to prevent radical Islamism and modernity
from seeping into their borders will be analyzed due to its consequential effect on the region.
Finally, the role that Saudi Arabian foreign policy has played on the complex Iran-Saudi ties will
be examined.
The next case study will be focused on Iran and will follow the same outline of the
previous chapter in order to analyze consistent variables. However, this Iranian case study will
differ in its content based on examining the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that greatly influenced
Iranian domestic and foreign policies. Also, similar to the previous case study, within this
chapter there will be an analysis of the role that Tehran has played in the Syrian Civil War,
fighting Islamic extremism.
The last case study will focus on Oman in relation to the potential role of this government
as mentioned previously. Within the discussion of Omani foreign policy there will be emphasis
on the individual relations that Oman has with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The data configured in this
case study has been formulated from previous Omani-led negotiations. Thus, the entirety of this
chapter is focused on this role that the government has and will potentially play throughout the
region.
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CHAPTER ONE: SAUDI ARABIA
Introduction

The significance in studying Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policies and relating
this political system to Islamic thought is because religion is the basis for the government and the
establishment for culture in this society. Islam is the religion of almost all of the people living in
Saudi Arabia. 1 It is additionally the foundation of the Constitution in Saudi Arabia known as
Sharia law. 2 Thus, it can be understood that religion has a lot of implications on Saudi society;
Islam effects the way in which the people are governed, educated, and how the simply live their
lives. While the integration of Islam throughout a state is not unique to Saudi Arabia, the way in
which Islam is immersed in the lives of the Saudi citizens is distinctive due to its strict Wahhabi
movement. Therefore, the domestic and foreign policy decisions that the Saudi government
enacts are seen as unique as well.

It is critical to understand the impact of Islam as a religion, as well as an ideology
throughout Saudi Arabia due to its vast amount of influence throughout this state and region. In
order to grasp this significance, the roots of Islamic thought in Arabia must be articulated. Thus,
the proceeding section will be a discussion regarding Islamic roots within Arabia and its effects.

It is widely known that Islam was born in Arabia. The prophet Muhammad had lived in
Mecca, which is known as one of the two holy cities within the Islamic religion. When Islam had
first begun, it was not a very popular religion. In fact, persecutors forced Muhammad out of his
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home in Mecca and he ended up in Medina, where he spent the majority of the rest of his life.
Fortunately, Islam gained a foothold within Medina and the religion was able to spread quickly
after a better foundation. This is why Medina is known as the other holy city. However,
Muhammad was not satisfied with the way in which he left Mecca—towards the end of his life
he wanted to make amends with those who persecuted him and Islam. So, he set about
journeying from Medina to Mecca. This journey would soon become one of the five pillars that
all Muslims must follow—the Hajj.

The Hajj is an annual occurrence and every Muslim, if able and well, must complete this
epic journey to Mecca. To this day, Mecca bursts at its seams with individuals seeking to
complete this journey and therefore professing their commitment to Islam and God.

It is important to note that the world has significantly changed since Muhammad had
trekked to Mecca—there are countries now that did not exist until long after the prophet had
passed. This is vital to discuss because of the implications that regional hostility has on
practicing Islam. While a majority of citizens residing within the Middle Eastern region identify
themselves as Muslim, it is ultimately the Saudi government whom has the ability to dictate who
can and cannot enter Mecca and Medina. 3 After all, this holy city is within their borders. The
issues regarding this entrance in reference to Iranians will be discussed later in this chapter.

However, Islam doesn’t only affect the foreign policies that the Saudi government
enforces, in fact the entire governmental system is based on Sharia law. This system of
governance plays a significant role on the way in which the nation of Saudi Arabia functions.
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Thus, a discussion must be held regarding the meshing of religion and government within Saudi
Arabia’s borders.
Domestic Policies
As mentioned earlier, the Saudi government uses Sharia law for its legal system. This
legal system has its basis in Islam, but in order to understand the differences between Saudi
Arabia and other states, it must be known that the Islam practiced within the Saudi government is
Wahhabism. Wahhabism is a strict Sunni Islamic movement that began in the 18th century and it
is considered by the Saudi government to be the most pure form of Islam.
The Wahhabi movement within Arabia has resulted in some particular policies that are
unique to this state and have caused uproar from within and outside of Saudi borders.
The Saudi government has had to deal with issues regarding the rights of individuals
within the nation. Minority religions residing in Saudi Arabia are sometimes considered to be
repressed by the government. Some of the oppression has even resulted in protests and small
uprisings. Thus, the Shi’a community within Saudi Arabia will be evaluated as it affects not only
a community within Saudi Arabia, but also a community existent throughout the entire region.
A fair amount of Shi’a Muslims living inside of Saudi Arabia took advantage of the
opportunity to revolt during the 2011 Arab Spring because it was a time in which many people
began to participate in demonstrations against the government. These disconcerting stirrings
eventually spelled disaster and chaos for the Saudi government. The worst of the uprisings
resulted from the youthful interventions—as the younger generations felt that the policies
inflicted upon the entire nation was not equal. The Saudi government tried desperately to counter
the Arab Spring demonstrations and while the efforts seemed to look successful, the protests
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enacted by the Shi’a Muslims residing in the Eastern Province in 2011 turned into the longest
and largest protest movement in the Kingdom’s modern history. 4 The Saudi government prides
itself on the stability of the nation. While states surrounding this regime seem to be changing due
in part by modernization—Saudi Arabia has managed to continue some of the same policies that
were enacted when the state was formed. 5 The reason for this stability is sometimes given the
label of repression, but whatever name it is given, it is undoubtedly understood that stability
within this region is a feat. Understandably, such an accomplishment is guarded and intended to
be eternally secured—many moves the Saudi government takes or doesn’t take is due to the
desire to keep the stability alive in this state. 6 So, when minority groups, such as the Shi’a
Muslims inside Saudi Arabia, threaten this stability with protests and uprisings, there will be
unforgiving consequences.
There have been indications that the Shi’a protests have been due in large part because of
uneven development and the discrimination against the Shi’a population led by the state. The
Twelver Shi’a population of Saudi Arabia constitutes about 10% of the population
approximating at 2.5 million people. 7 These Shi’a Muslims are mostly concentrated in and near
the regions of al-Hasa and Qatif, which make up two of the major oases in the Eastern Province
of Saudi Arabia. 8
From October 2011 to September 2012, many young Shi’a Muslims have been affected
by state-led violence including the firing of weapons on Shi’a civilians by security forces. Some
of the funerals of those individuals whom were killed during the violent incidences turned into
the site of the largest demonstrations since an uprising by Saudi Shi’a groups in 1979-80. 9 These
modern Shi’a protestors utilized resistance to mobilize the public and had adopted the general
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themes of the Arab Spring uprisings—karama, hurriyya, and huquq; meaning dignity, freedom,
and rights, respectively. 10
Clashes between the Sunni and Shi’a population in Saudi Arabia seemed inevitable due
to the domestic policies within Saudi Arabia. For instance, the state does not provide nearly as
much funding for Shi’a charities or infrastructures as provided for the Sunni population. 11 This
has created a civil society that has become independent from the state, marginalized and pushed
to a brink. This society has grown immensely due to the use of community websites and news
outlets such as Rasid. While the Shi’a community seems to multiply by the usage of these
outlets, this rhetoric is available to all Saudi citizens including Sunni Muslims, which has
resulted in widening the gap between these two differing communities even further. The
subsequent protests resulting from the usage of the limited but valuable Internet access has
demotivated the Sunni population of Saudi Arabia to rise against the government. 12 Not only
does the Sunni population see the consequences of such anti-government rhetoric, the rhetoric
attacks the Sunni branch of Islam. Interestingly enough, the state has successfully prevented
Sunni Muslims from joining the anti-government rhetoric by denouncing the Shi’a branch of
Islam as “an Iranian fifth column…” 13 While there might be many Sunni Muslims whom are not
satisfied with the way in which their government functions, they identify themselves with the
Wahhabi government rather than the Shi’a protestors.
The counter-revolutionary strategies of the Saudi regime has included: denouncing all
protests as foreign schemes, sending military officials to Bahrain to assist with the Shi’a protests
there, and to take a pre-emptive position on the uprisings in Syria. 14 These efforts were intended
to refract the anger of the Sunnis away from the royal family. 15 However, while the strategies
have more or less succeeded on ensuring the safety of the Sunni majority of Saudi Arabia, the
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efforts have also created a bigger detriment in the gap between the Saudi regime and the Shi’a
civil society as well as those Shi’a Muslims throughout the entire Persian Gulf region whom are
dissatisfied with Saudi policies. 16
Foreign Policies
While Islam seems to influence every policy that the Saudi government enacts, this
influence is not necessarily a direct relationship. The foreign policies enacted are merely ways in
which the Saudi state is able to protect and serve the nation through relations with other states.
One such protection is based on the idea that stability in the region will help in continuing the
stability of the Saudi regime. Unfortunately, the status quo of this delicate region has deemed
stability to be farfetched, but the Saudi government is attempting to isolate the issues and attack
them at their core. Two global headliners apparent in this region are the issues regarding the
Syrian Civil War and the nuclear technology of Iran. The Saudi state has found themselves
entangled in these issues not only because these states are close in proximity to Saudi Arabia, but
also because Saudi Arabia is seen as one of the largest influencers of the Persian Gulf region.
The civil turmoil within Syria has acted as a magnet for surrounding states, and even
those states’ allies from overseas. Saudi Arabia has not been immune from this magnetic
attraction and is considered one of the most active states of this conflict. 17 Not surprisingly, Iran
and Saudi Arabia have butted heads more than once regarding what to do about the Syrian
uprisings. In fact, these two states have picked opposite policy paths and have managed to fight
one another through Syria’s turmoil. This is why the Syrian Civil War is occasionally deemed as
an Iran-Saudi proxy war. 18 The civil distress within Syria has been substantially shaped by the
Iran-Saudi dispute. While the relationship between these two states is notorious for being
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turbulent, the Syrian Civil War has given the Iran and Saudi states the ability to continue their
unfriendly relations. This issue has not only provided a landscape for direct confrontations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but it has also exacerbated the justification for the fighting
between these two states.
While there are many instances in which the Syrian Civil War has been titled as purely a
sectarian conflict—Sunnis against Shi’ites, each actor within this issue has its own reasons for
continuing to engage in this conflict. What is known regarding religion pertaining to this issue is
that Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria at the time of this conflict, was considered to run the
government based on a small branch of Shi’a Islam. Thus, at the time of this conflict, it can be
stated that Iran and Syria are Shi’ite states, while Saudi Arabia is a Sunni state. The Iranian
regime has repeatedly backed the Assad regime, while the Saudi government has continually
gone against Assad and this is why this conflict is sometimes discussed as being a battle between
Sunnis and Shi’ites. However, as stated before, each individual actor involved in this turmoil has
its own reasons for continuing the fight and it is therefore not accurate to simply state that this is
a purely sectarian conflict. So, although the policies of all three states discussed are based on
Islamic ideology, this does not necessarily result in a battle between opposing Islamic branches.
In order to understand this conflict and potentially aide in the stopping of such
exacerbation of future conflicts, it is significant to begin with the discussion of ways in which the
main actors have progressively reacted towards the Civil War. In this chapter, there will be a
discussion regarding Saudi Arabia’s role in this conflict while the proceeding chapter will go into
detail about Iran’s reactions towards this battle.
It is well known that the Saudi government has intended, from the very start, to unseat
Assad. 19 Regarding this aspiration, there have been speculations as to who or what the Saudi
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regime desires in Assad’s place, but so far none of these speculations have been confirmed. What
is known is that among other states, Saudi Arabia has pursued policies of aiding the Syrian
opposition, known as the Free Syrian Army. 20 While it’s ideal to assume that all states aiding the
Syrian opposition have gotten along famously, this has simply not been the case. In fact, Saudi
Arabia is noted as having skirmishes with Qatar. The disagreements between Qatar and Saudi
Arabia have been described as especially damaging for the Free Syrian Army because the forces
are split into two, making the ability to overthrow Assad’s regime even more difficult. However,
the Gulf States had not always disagreed on the issue of the Syrian Civil War. In fact, in the
beginnings of the conflict there was consensus among the Gulf coalition that Assad should
remain in power because it would be more beneficial for future aspirations. 21 It has been
speculated that if the Gulf States had continued down this path, the Syrian regime would have
gradually detached from the influence of Iran, which had been a side goal of Saudi Arabia and
the UAE. 22
At these beginning stages, Qatar had been the most substantial defender and longest Gulf
ally of Assad’s regime. 23 Unfortunately for Assad, Qatar as well as Turkey, had encouraged the
broken government to undergo significant reforms such as allowing Islamic involvement in the
government, as well as diverging from Iran. 24 Qatar had received the backing of the Saudi
monarchy at the time; the King sent a warning to Assad and insisted,
What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia… Syria should think wisely
before it’s too late and issue and enact reforms that are not merely promises but actual
reforms. Either it chooses wisdom on its own or it will be pulled down into the depths of
turmoil and loss. 25

Assad was not willing to complete these changes and Qatar, with the support of the Gulf
States, pulled the decision on backing his regime. As if the Saudi monarchy had predicted the

35

future, the Assad regime was in fact pulled down into the depths of turmoil and loss. Soon after
this statement was issued, the next phase of the Syrian Civil War was initiated. All Gulf States
had come together to mobilize the Arab League in order to counter the Assad regime. This
coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, gradually ensured that Syria would become politically isolated by
internationally and regionally condemning Syria as well as applying sanctions. 26
Yet, there are more reasons behind the Saudi desire to come out victorious with their
efforts in Syria than simply having distasteful thoughts about Assad’s regime. With Tehran
growing larger in influence by each passing day and obtaining Syria as an ally, Riyadh had noted
that their own influence was beginning to sway. Thus, the Syrian Civil War became an event in
which the Saudi government intended to correct the recent changes in the balance of regional
power that had shifted in favor of Iran. 27 Understanding this allows light to be shed on why the
Syrian Civil War has escalated into what most scholars consider a proxy war between Iran and
Saudi Arabia. For Saudi Arabia, there was a lot to lose if the Syrian Civil War wouldn’t turn out
in their favor. If the Assad regime would last, Iran would gain an important victory—a trusted,
allied neighbor. The Saudi government could not afford another loss to Shi’a dominant parties;
they had experienced this loss after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the developing of
Iranian influence within Baghdad. The Saudi regime intended to not lose another, which would
result in Iran gaining more allies throughout the delicate region. If the Saudi regime was able to
defeat Assad and another political power emerged, then this would severe the ties between Iran
and Hezbollah, Iran’s principal ally. The Saudi government understood the gravity of this
situation and expressed that a victory would in fact change the winds in the favor of their
influence.
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This calculation was farfetched and required some imagination regarding the events that
would take place after the Syrian Civil War was over, however it was a calculation nonetheless.
The Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia, supported this estimate with the fact that a majority of
Syrians identify themselves as Sunni Muslim, and these individuals sincerely opposed Assad’s
Alawite regime. 28 Even more evidence for this calculation was developed due to the links that
the Gulf States had with Syria—there were a large number of Syrians whom had tribal
affiliations or lived within Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. 29 The Gulf States claimed to be
very familiar with the way in which the Syrian society and government functioned—there were
many shared business and international interests between the ruling elites of the Gulf States and
Syria. 30 All of this had developed into an assumption that if Saudi Arabia, supported by the Gulf
coalition, were able to unseat Assad, they would begin to gain more influence throughout the
region once again.
However, as mentioned before, there were quite a lot of disagreements between Saudi
Arabia and allied states, such as Qatar. In any scenario, the ability to dismantle a regime in the
middle of such civil turmoil is a difficult task indeed, but coupled with the fighting between
allied states, the task became even more insurmountable. The Saudi government and Qatar didn’t
fight about everything revolving around the Civil War—they agreed on and successfully
recruited Western allies, the UN, and the Friends of Syria to help the opposition. 31 However,
these two states employed independent and often contradictory efforts to see the fall of Assad.
Where they disagreed most was when discussing the favored allies within the Syrian opposition,
as well as regional allies. 32
Saudi Arabia had a broad list of contacts within Syria that were known to support the
Syrian opposition. These individuals were understood to be businessmen, government officials,
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liberals, chiefs of tribes, as well as Muslim clerics from differing branches. The regional actors
that aligned with Saudi Arabia was the UAE and the Jordanian government, the latter became
Saudi’s principal ally. 33 The disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Qatar managed to develop
into power struggles between the two states in regards to positions available inside the Syrian
opposition. Unfortunately for the Gulf States, the skirmishes between the Riyadh and Doha ate
away at the credibility of the opposition. Not only did the international community begin to feel
uneasy over the disagreements, but also within the Syrian opposition many individuals felt that
their leaders were merely being used as pawns in a chess match between the most influential
Gulf States. While the Syrian opposition became weakened from the inside out, the two states
that were responsible for this withering had not taken on the task of completely training and
providing operational aide on the military front. The opposition became more disorganized and
this provided the Syrian army with numerous opportunities to weaken the rebel forces even more
so. Saudi Arabia was now witnessing a nightmare; their trusted allies had caused the rebellion to
diminish and their main adversary, Iran would once again take the lead on spreading their
influence throughout the region.
Yet, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in particular had a few more tricks up their sleeves.
The Saudi government found themselves allying with the Jaysh al-Islam, a large Salafist group
within Syria. While this would help Saudi’s efforts in the short-term, the more support the
regime gave to this group; the number of radicals that intended to dominate the rebellion grew
substantially. Saudi Arabia’s disagreements with Iran and Qatar would eventually result in the
rise in jihadist movements within the rebellion. But for a short-term solution, the Saudi led
coalition, with the exception of the Emirati government, concluded that it was worth the risk to
support those who aided radical groups especially if this meant the demise of the Assad regime. 34
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It is at this point that an individual can truly discover the commitment that Saudi Arabia has
towards ousting Assad. To the dismay of Saudi Arabia, this calculation of victory would be short
lived; the rise of al-Qaeda affiliated organizations and the revival of ISIS developed into
antagonistic rhetoric towards the Gulf States. 35 As of recent, ISIS has begun to dominate Syria
and millions of citizens have been killed, displaced, or have been forced to flee from the wrath of
jihadist groups. This was clearly a detrimental and deplorable mistake on behalf of the Saudi
government. The international community has condemned the Gulf monarchies as being, at the
very least, negligent in preventing the development of dangerous jihadist organizations. In a
seemingly inevitable change of events, the monarchies lost a considerable amount of credibility
and influence; the victory of this drawn-out battle appears to continually fall in the palms of Iran.
Conclusion
The current Saudi state has evidently gone through many developments over time, but
what is most curious is the fact that this state has more or less stayed the same throughout these
developments. Due to the continuing of certain policies and maintaining a stable regime, the
Saudi government has been able to develop a sense of honor around their state system. This
honor has been well deserved; it has become a difficult task to maintain order in such a large
state throughout this region in the late 20th and 21st centuries. Threats to this stability have come
from every which direction—internally and externally. One external threat had come from Iran
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The government of Iran announced that it was the only pure
Islamic state, however that position was supposedly already filled by Saudi Arabia. While this
might not seem like a huge issue, this statement by the Iranian government served as a direct
threat the stability of Saudi Arabia. As discussed earlier, Saudi Arabia runs a government based
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on Islamic law; the king of Saudi Arabia is considered to have merit because of religious
confirmation. When Iran made a statement about their state being the only one in which pure
Islam was being practiced, it directly undermined the value and ability for a Saudi king to rule
the nation. So, while religion is only an indirect variable in this process, an individual is able to
see how domestic policies, which are affected by religion and ideology, have the ability to cause
more hostility between two differing states.
The domestic policies and statements that Iran had made in 1979 are only part of the
picture that needs to be painted. Saudi Arabia’s domestic policies are also capable of causing and
contributing to more hostility between these two states. One of the issues that have been arising
from Saudi Arabia is the amount of individuals that are pledging to the radical Islamic ideology.
Many of these individuals have been joining terrorist organizations that have been creating
trouble throughout the Middle Eastern region. Thus, many states throughout this region are under
the impression that Saudi Arabia should handle this issue internally and develop a system in
which citizens will not be so attracted to radicalizing. Unfortunately, the understanding is that
Saudi government has done little to punish and/or detract individuals from radicalizing. Of the
states that are unimpressed and angry over Saudi Arabia’s lack of passion on this issue is their
Saudi’s Persian Gulf Neighbor: Iran. So, as stated earlier, while religion is the motivator for
policies and actions throughout governmental systems, it is the domestic policies in which the
state does or does not enact that truly debilitate the relationship that state has with its neighbors.
The geography of Saudi Arabia has influenced the development of the state as a whole.
There is not a lot of livable land within the country, so a majority of the population lives in
densely populated cities. Since Saudi Arabia has major coastlines on the Persian Gulf and Red
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Sea, these costal areas provide the state with opportunities to trade extensively. This especially
helps the state when trading and shipping oil. 36
Moreover, the Saudi government benefited immensely from the discovery and production
of oil. Saudi Arabia is known for being the world’s number one oil exporter as well as one of the
most active members of OPEC. 37 Like many of the states in the region however, the leadership is
looking into the diversification of the economy through the means of privatization and
developing more jobs for Saudi nationals. Similarly, the youth of Saudi Arabia is cited as being
uneducated and unskilled in terms of being able to work within the private sector. This has led
the government to focus on this youth population, in more ways than one.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s geography in relation to land borders has also affected the
development of the state. Surrounding the country are many states that have been afflicted by
instable regimes. These states include, but are not limited to: Yemen, Israel, and Iraq. The
instable regimes have proved as a threat to the stability and wellness of the Saudi state. The
reasons behind the instability within these other states are varied, but what has been established
is that the Saudi government has become surrounded by states that have gone through political
turmoil. Some of these have developed into Shi’ite states, and this has not provided any sense of
relief for the Saudi monarchy. Since Saudi Arabia is known as a strict Sunni state, the idea of
opposition being so close to home is unsettling, to say the least.
Yet, it isn’t just the opposition from neighboring governments that has provided an outlet
of worry for the monarchy. Also on the list of concerns is Islamic extremism within and
surrounding the state. On multiple occasions there have been discussions regarding the amount
of Islamic extremists that have roots in the strict Sunni state. This has angered states within the
region because of a lack of accountability from the monarchy. On the other hand, there are many
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radicals that have not sprouted from Saudi Arabia. However, these individuals are concerning to
Saudi Arabia because they are performing malicious acts very close to the state’s borders. This is
why the state is known to be very active throughout the combat against Islamic extremism in the
region.
In essence, geography and resources have provided the Kingdom with opportunities for
wealth and growth. However, some of the geographical aspects have not ended in the same
beneficial way. While the government is attempting to focus on developing a more diverse
economy, educating the youth, and stabilizing the state, there are many internal and external
factors that are forcing the government to focus on matters of security.
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CHAPTER TWO: IRAN
Introduction
In this chapter, Iranian domestic and foreign policies are evaluated. These characteristics
will be discussed in comparative terms in order to connect and compare similar features of other
states, especially Saudi Arabia. Among the current events that are evaluated within this chapter
are the nuclear program occurring within Tehran and its involvement in the Syrian Civil War.
However, before the discussion on Iranian policies, it is necessary to understand the implications
of institutionalizing religion within the Iranian government. This is because Iran follows similar
governmental patterns as Saudi Arabia does—Tehran abides by and enforces Sharia law. The
differences between the ways these laws are implemented lie in the differences between each
country’s state religion. While it was previously discussed that Saudi Arabia follows a strict form
of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabi, the Iranian state guides its nation based on Shi’a Islam. These
differences might not seem expansive, but it has led to historical as well as contemporary
divergences between both states. Therefore, it is imperative that a discussion must be held
regarding the transformation of the Iranian state—from a more secular government, to one that
pronounces itself as the only pure Islamic state. In order to develop a complete understanding of
this incredible alteration, one must dive deep into the event that began it all: the 1979 Islamic
Revolution.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the only country on the globe in which a far-reaching
Islamic revolution has occurred and Shi’ism was subsequently deemed the state religion. 1
However, the historical relevance of Shi’ism within Iran didn’t begin with this revolution, the
political institutionalization of Shi’ism in Iran began in 1501 when Shah Esmail I founded the
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Safavid Empire. 2 Shah Esmail I adopted Shi’ism as the Empire’s religion in order to distinguish
his country from their adversary—the Sunni Ottoman Empire. 3 This is important to note because
this might help explain the long history of dysfunctional relations between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. However, it wasn’t until the 1960s in which Shi’ism began to culminate politically when
Ruhollah Khomeini began to lead Iran with his concept of velayat-e faqih, meaning the authority
of the jurisconsult. 4
However, before the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini became the Ayatollah and
instilled a different type of governmental organization in Iran, the Shah of Iran ruled over the
masses. Thus, the reasons for the start of the 1979 Islamic Revolution are identical to the reasons
for the demise of the Shah’s regime—the collapse of the Pahlavi regime led right into the Islamic
Revolution. This revolution was religiously inspired, fueled by an utter disapproval for the
Shah’s regime and disgust due to the amounting level of Iranians dipping underneath the poverty
line. 5 The leader of this Islamic Revolution was Ruhollah Khomeini who became the Ayatollah
of Iran due to his ability to connect with the Iranian people, before, during, and after his
fourteen-year exile from Iran. Khomeini stressed specific values of justice, independence, and
Islamic-piety. He rejected the influence of western culture and secularization that were enacted
in policies within the 20th century under the Shah’s rule. Khomeini managed to integrate religion,
economics, and societal issues and this pleased the Iranian population very much—especially in
comparison to the Shah’s policies. 6
The Islamic Revolution brought about fundamental changes in the Iranian government.
This Revolution led the Iranian government to update the outdated constitution. This resulted in
the development of the Iranian constitution of 1979. However, over time Iran has gone through

46

more transformations—laws have been altered and the Iranian constitution has changed once
again.
After the Revolution, the theory and institutionalization of velayat-e faqih began which
had deemed the supreme leader as the ultimate decision maker of important domestic and foreign
affairs—state power was said to essentially be in the hands of one person. 7 However, in 1989, at
the end of the Iran-Iraq War and after the death of Khomeini, the Iranian constitution was
revised. In this revision, the prime minister’s position was abolished and his tasks were taken
over by the president. The president is now considered the head of the government, but this
position is thought to be the second most influential political office and does not have a final say
on foreign policy decisions and does not have any control over the armed forces. The decision
making process goes from the foreign minister to the president to the Supreme National Security
Council (SNSC), and then finally to the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is in charge of
signing all bills. 8 Yet, these transformations have not been as severe as the changes that occurred
during and immediately after the Islamic Revolution. This state is described now as a semitheocratic rule that has origins in the Iranian constitution of 1906 and 1979. 9
Domestic Policies

The Pahlavi regime did not have the best track record with the greater majority of the
Iranian population—both Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and his father did not have the much
support from the Iranian people. 10 The Shah came to take the throne because he was next in line
and his father was abdicated by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The Shah was
inexperienced and continued his father’s policies even though the opinions of the Iranian citizens
were constantly spiraling downwards. 11
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Among the policy choices that eventually led to the demise of the Shah were the
economic and social policies—a majority of Iranians outwardly expressed their disapproval. At
the time, many Iranians felt alienated from the lack of economic policies that would sincerely
benefit those who were living in poverty. 12 The White Revolution that the Shah pursued was
seen, to many, as merely a symptom of the failures of the Shah’s economic policies—these
failures include: the failure the improve the healthcare of Iran, the failure to expand education,
and the failure to create jobs on a scale broad enough to be effective.

However, almost every nation has experienced low economic times and this is not seen as
enough to overthrow the throne and pursue an ideologically opposite replacement. There are
more reasons behind the beginning of such a widespread revolution. The Shah’s regime was
notorious for violating many human rights regulations and the general population of Iran was not
satisfied with this. The Shah insisted on enforcing the modern laws through the use of the
Sazman-I Ittili’at va Amniyat-I Kishvar (SAVAK) or the National Intelligence and Security
Organization. This organization was known for being extremely forceful especially when dealing
with any individual that would not submit to the Shah’s policies or when an individual would
speak out against the government. 13

While these violations are not to be overlooked by any mean, it is important to note that
there is another reason for the start of the Islamic Revolution. This reason lies in the
dissatisfaction for the relations that the Iranian government had with the West—the United States
in particular. These relations resulted in making the Iranian masses fearful and angry. While the
Shah seemed to benefit from and enjoy the cozy relations with Western states, the Iranian people
did not align with the same mentality. It has been noted that many Iranian citizens felt isolated
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and would consistently worry that the Shah would ultimately make choices that would benefit
the West more than their own nation. 14 There was fear that the Shah was more reluctant to
defend the rights and needs of his people, especially if it meant that he would possibly alienate
Western allies. Along similar lines, many Iranians felt that the close ties with the United States
and other western states led the Shah to enact policies that seemed too modern and too secular
for a more conservative, Islamic society. 15 Examples of these policies are the prohibition of
Muslim women wearing veils, the restriction of teaching the Qur’an in schools, and the use of
civil courts instead of Islamic courts. This conservative Shi’ite society saw these policies as
direct attacks on Islamic belief and tradition and this would eventually need to be dealt with
accordingly.

Ruhollah Khomeini understood that the general Iranian population was eager to make
political and ideological changes to the state and willingly took this opportunity to become the
leader of the revolution. For the general population of Iran, the close ties with the West resulted
in the Iranian government shifting priorities; the citizens did not feel comfortable with the idea of
the Shah making so many changes regarding the way in which the society functioned. So, while
the Shah tried to convince the Iranian society that his policies would bring them prosperity, the
words of Khomeini soon began to drown out the desperate attempts of the Shah rationalizing
with a nation that felt as if their identity was being taken away from them.

Nuclear Technology

The desire to obtain a nuclear weapon is not unique to Tehran; it is seen throughout the
Middle Eastern region. Although much is still kept secret and myths have replaced facts about
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the nuclear technology within this region, it is widely believed that Israel has obtained a weapon,
Pakistan with financial assistance from Saudi Arabia has had a nuclear weapon since 1998, and
Saddam’s Iraq had attempted to deter Iran by gaining nuclear technology. Many view that this
attraction to have a nuclear weapon is due to a security dilemma prevalent throughout this
region, and this dilemma seems to consistently attract many states. Saudi Arabia is not immune
from the desire to create a security system within this region that puts their state at the top.
Riyadh has made indications that if Tehran gains a nuclear weapon then they will pursue the
same policy. In fact in 2011, Prince Turki al-Faisal explicitly stated that the Gulf States should
create a group that would pursue nuclear power if Iran refuses to cease their nuclear program. 16
The reason the Prince gave as to why he wanted this coalition to be formed was due to the desire
for Iran’s nuclear program to be balanced-out. 17 However, the threat of a Saudi-led nuclear
coalition along with the scorn Tehran receives from the international community has yet to result
in a cease in nuclear aspirations.

One of the most crippling products of the nuclear negotiations for Iran has been the
sanctions placed on this state from a wide array of actors. 18 These tough sanctions have left
Iran’s society in a state of despair as a majority of its citizens are dipping into a pool of poverty.
Iran does not have enough internal revenue to continue domestic services that many citizens rely
on for economic security. Numerous scholars have suggested that if Iranian officials were more
open to negotiations, the economic situation in Iran would improve dramatically, over a
reasonable amount of time. Furthermore, the relationship that Iran has with Israel, the Western
hemisphere, and Sunni Arab states would noticeably improve. Yet, Iran has been reluctant to
budge even an inch on any type of negotiation. In fact, there is talk in the international
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community that suggests Iran is taking their time with negotiations as a tactic—once they obtain
a nuclear weapon, negotiations would shift dramatically, in the favor of Tehran. Time is not on
Iran’s side, so the state is hoping to make up for this on their own terms. 19 However, both sides
of the negation table are so far apart that reaching an agreement seems improbable at this point,
especially because neither side is willing to budge on their conditions. Unfortunately and
fortunately, incidents within the Middle Eastern region concerning Iran and the P5+1 have the
potential to be used as political tools during these negotiations.

Yet, regardless of the manifesting situations, Iran (like many other states) seems
completely invested on continuing and further developing their nuclear program. Therefore,
while the Syrian Civil War has potential to cultivate into a political tool throughout nuclear
negotiations, the reality is that international headlines like the Civil War seem to rank lower than
nuclear aspirations do on the Iranian priority list. Further adding to this dilemma is the idea that
Iranian efforts towards the Syrian Civil War seem to be paying off, so to speak.

This overwhelming dedication to such an internationally taboo policy begs the question
as to why Tehran chooses to endure such dramatic consequences. Unfortunately, that answer will
only be speculated upon, and will be given many different ideas from many different faces.
However, what should be studied is the fact that Tehran chooses to pursue this policy and Saudi
Arabia’s reaction to this policy choice. What can be confirmed is exactly what many authors
have previously stated: Riyadh is not enjoying Tehran’s nuclear aspirations. Even more is that
Saudi government has spoken on multiple occasions about their ability and desire to obtain
nuclear technology if Iran refuses to stop their program. So, now it is time to connect the dots
between actions and reactions.

51

First, Iran should be analyzed. For the sake of this discussion speculations will only be
made in regards to the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It has already been stated that
the bond Riyadh and Tehran share is one of unfavorable nature. This has more or less been on
the increase since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but is the threat from Saudi influences enough
to keep the nuclear plans alive? The answer is probably no, especially because Saudi Arabia does
not have a nuclear weapon of their own. However, it likely doesn’t help that the Saudi military
has been increasing in size and capacity over the past decade.

So, while there are a lot of unknowns regarding the reasons as to why nuclear ability has
become very attractive to Tehran, what is known is that each state’s domestic policies
concerning state security has the ability to affect the other’s policies. When states are close to
one another and pursue security policies that are looked at as offensive in nature, it is quite
evident as to how and why a vicious cycle of offensive and defensive strategy is able to
formulate so quickly. To put this in comparative terms, let’s take the United States as an
example. The United States has the advantage and disadvantage of having only two bordering
neighbors: Canada and Mexico. While the United States enjoys, for the most part, good relations
with each state, the policies regarding border protection that the U.S. has enacted have been seen
in a negative light. Securing and monitoring the border between the U.S. and Mexico has been
considered offensive to many Mexican citizens and officials. This lack of consensus on the issue
has led to a decline in the relations between Mexico and the United States. So, while securing the
border is considered a domestic policy, the United States is also aware of the international affairs
that are being dramatically affected. Bringing this back to Iran and Saudi Arabia, each of these
gulf states has more than triple the amount of bordering neighbors that the U.S. has. So, while
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domestic policies might seem insignificant or purely internal to Iran and/or Saudi Arabia, the fact
of the matter is that states are affected by their neighbors’ policies. Taking this even further, Iran
is pursuant of a weapon that could wipe out an entire nation, so the offensive nature of this
policy is seen as even more intense than securing a border or two.

Foreign Policies

While it is well known that Iran and Saudi Arabia have a dysfunctional relationship, this
has not always been the case. In fact, in some instances, mutual interests have been cited as being
a factor for producing an amiable bond between these two Persian Gulf states. There is research
that supports that both monarchies bonded over the fear of colonialism especially in 1958 when
Iraq’s King Faysal II was overthrown. 20 It was then that the Shah of Iran and King Sa’ud formed
an alliance termed as the Twin Pillars policy. This alliance was purely a foreign policy stance
that supported and encouraged pro-Western, conservative influence in the region. 21
Unfortunately this foreign policy alliance was at the expense of their Gulf neighbor—Iraq. The
Twin Pillars policy lasted from 1968 until 1979, when the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran,
and this would be the last time that an extended period of friendly relations existed between Iran
and Saudi Arabia. 22

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 did not just have domestic implications; it had major
effects on foreign affairs as well. As Iran developed into a state whose basis of law was Islam,
Saudi Arabia’s own establishment was automatically threatened. Al Sa’ud of Saudi Arabia
claimed to rule according to basic Islamic traditions, however Ayatollah Khomeini expressed
that Saudi Arabia’s form of government was not valid and Iran would be known as the only pure
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Islamic state. 23 Essentially, Al Sa’ud’s legitimacy had been threatened by a state that had
successfully overthrown their leader. This severely angered the Saudi government—Iran had
begun to gain quite a number of influential adversaries.

Around this time, Saddam’s Iraq was also not pleased with the Iranian government. So, in
1980, the Iraqi military invaded Iran. However, this could not have been done without any
assistance from one influential neighbor: Saudi Arabia. Due to geographical constraints, it was
essential for Iraq to seek assistance from Riyadh and the Saudi government responded positively.
Saudi officials allowed Iraqi aircrafts to be stationed at some Saudi airbases. 24 Although the
Saudi government viewed the Iranian regime to be offensive and distasteful, Arabia was not
completely friendly with Saddam’s Iraq either, so Iran never received full-force combat from
Riyadh. 25 Iran was, however, severely weakened domestically and internationally due to the
Islamic Revolution and the Iraqi invasion. So, following the Iran-Iraq War, the balance of
interregional relations began to change once again. The Saudi government concluded that Iran
was weakened to such an extent that this state was no longer a significant threat. In fact, the
boisterous Iraqi government seemed to pose a larger threat to the balance of regional influence. 26
Thus, the world witnessed yet another shift in regional order as Saudi Arabia attempted to secure
and defend their spot as the leading Persian Gulf influencer.

Following the cease-fire of the Iraqi invasion, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia developed a
stance that shocked many. In 1989, King Fahd spoke about Iran-Saudi relations in an interview
and stated,
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We cannot change the geographic reality of Iran and Iran cannot change our geographic
reality…On our side, we do not ask Iran for anything more than mutual respect and good
neighborliness, which are the same things that Iran requests. 27
So, in 1991, for the first time in four years, Saudi Arabia allowed Iranians access to fulfill
the fifth pillar of Islam—the pilgrimage to Mecca. 28

Syrian Civil War

Civil War that has acted as a magnet to many Middle Eastern states including the two
leading Persian Gulf states--Iran and Saudi Arabia. When discussing the extent of the
involvement that Iran has decided to enact, it is imperative to understand the basics behind this
civil strife. Thus, it is important to acknowledge that the current President, President Bashar alAssad is not popular amongst his masses, his foreign neighbors, and even his allies have not
spoken highly of his regime. However, even though there is much agreement that Assad’s
government is condemnable, the efforts that each Gulf state has conducted have exposed rivalries
between friendly states and especially between adversaries. 29 In fact, some scholars have named
the Syrian crisis as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 30 Saudi Arabia has taken a direct
stance on supporting the Free Syrian Army, which means the Saudi government now must
discuss its foreign policy choices with its number of allies that have taken a similar stance but an
opposing route to achieve the mutual goal. Yet, Iran has stood in a category of their own as one
of the most supportive allies of al-Assad’s regime in this Syrian conflict. 31 The picture of Iranian
support should not be painted as one free from blemishes, however. So in order to understand
why Iranian officials have conducting policy in such an isolated, yet specific manner, it is
important to note the dynamics of the relationship between Iran, Syria, and Turkey before this
conflict erupted.
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Syria and Iran have had a fairly close relationship since the Islamic Revolution in 1979
that occurred within Iranian borders. Even though Syria is considered to be a secular state and
Iran an Islamic republic, the mutual political interests between these two had resulted into
forming a strategic bond. When the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Syria came to assist Iran in
countering Iraq, as they both shared a common enemy—Saddam Hussein. Yet, in 2003 with the
fall of the Baath regime in Iraq, decision makers of Iran began to see Iraq as a potential ally. 32
Some scholars site the change of government in Iraq as a reason for foreign policy shifts within
the Iranian government. Of these shifts that occurred was the roller coaster of a relationship that
Iran now faced with Syria due to allying with Iraq—militarily and economically. 33 At first IranSyrian relations seemed unaffected; in 2005 both governments agreed to a mutual defense pact. 34
On the contrary, behind the scenes, Damascus was seeking more security and commercial
relations with Ankara and the relationship that Tehran had with Ankara at this time was not seen
as admirable. 35 The thought of Syria growing closer to a state in which Iran was not friendly with
did not settle well in the minds of Iranian officials.

Therefore, there was a push for relations between Iran and Turkey improve, and they did,
due to instances of mutual adversaries, like Israel. In 2008, the Turkish population and
government were greatly upset due to a military offensive instigated by Israel against Gaza. In
response to the Israeli decisions, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan criticized Israeli President
Shimon Peres at the 2009 World Economic Forum. 36 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
thanked Erdogan for his criticism of Peres; the Turkish Prime Minister then went on to
congratulating Ahmadinejad on winning reelection. 37 While this might all seem insignificant, in
October of 2009, Erdogan went public to describe Iran’s nuclear program as “an exercise in

56

nuclear energy, an exercise with peaceful and humanitarian goals.” 38 While the relations with
Turkey seemed to look bright, especially in 2009 and 2010, the rift that occurs between these two
states regarding the decisions of the Syrian Civil War would later result in an immediate
dissipation of amiable relations. 39

Although one might presume that the close association that Ankara and Tehran began to
develop could potentially put Damascus in a state of competitive angst, this was not the case.
These three states worked well together for the few years of their alliance. 40 Yet, this delicate
triangular relationship was certainly not one in which each state would conduct policy solely
based on the other states. For instance, the Syrian government has made decisions counter to
Iranian choices. One of these decisions occurred in March of 2011, when President Assad
refrained from condemning the Gulf state’s intervention in Bahrain, which earned him some
lenience with the Gulf States, but not any friendly concessions with Iran. 41 While the IranianSyrian relationship may seem as mutual as transnational ties might come, there is much to be
said that occurs behind the scenes. Thus, it is important to discuss the transformation of the
Syrian conflict while specifying the foreign policies that the Iranian government had enacted in
accordance to the Syrian conflict from 2011 until present day.

In 2011 when the Syrian conflict took a hold of Assad’s nation, his government might
have expected to see Iran as a forefront actor in assisting in measures to ensure the survival of
Assad’s regime, however this was not the case—Qatar and Turkey became the most substantive
allies at this time. 42 Qatar and Turkey drafted up approaches to and for Assad that many presume
were fundamentally flawed because Assad was never willing to allow any sort of Islamic
participation in his government or to part ways with Iran. 43 While the list proceeds regarding the
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failures and weaknesses of the Qatari and Turkish approaches, it is important to note that Bashar
al-Assad refused to follow the advice of the two trusted allies that came to his assistance. Was
the Assad regime waiting for a more regionally dominant state? At the time of these failures, the
Syrian rebels were gaining a better foothold in the country due to the dramatically increased
assistance from many of the Gulf States. 44 Iranian involvement up until this time had been
merely but a watchful eye on the situation. However, when the crisis became severe enough
Iranian officials came to the realization that there was a grave possibility Assad’s regime would
falter due to the pressure that the Syrian rebels and their Gulf States alliances have subjected
onto this regime. Therefore, Iranian policy flipped 180 degrees.

In 2011 during the early motions of the Syrian uprising, Iranian representatives only
advised Syrian officials on how to conduct domestic policies in a manner that would avoid
estranging a majority of Syrians. 45 Yet, quickly Iranian officials found themselves contacting and
moderating agreements between Islamist forces in Tunisia and Egypt that would be favorable to
Assad; however the Syrian president and the Muslim Brotherhood’s representatives in Syria
were not in agreement to any settlements, marking a failure for Iran. 46 Nearing the end of 2011,
Iranian officials soon began to agree that Assad’s regime did not have the wherewithal to
survive, and the foreign policies within Iran on dealing with the Syrian crisis made a 90 degree
turn—there was a mission to find a replacement for President Bashar al-Assad that would
continue to relationship with Iran as Assad’s regime had and would be suitable for the Syrian
population. 47 In essence, the Iranian government wished to remove Assad and his top officials
while keeping his system of government in place. However, the establishment of the Syrian
government based upon kinship made this mission impossible, and Iranian officials soon found
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themselves in a decision-making pickle. It was soon decided that the next initiative would be to
again, assist al-Assad’s regime and insist the survival of such. However, this time the Iranian
government would not hold back on the amount of support that would go towards this objective.
In 2012 the commitment was confirmed when General Qassem Suleimani commander of the
Quds Force, an exclusive group within the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) visited
Damascus. After this meeting, Iranian assistance increased dramatically in amount and
visibility. 48 Iran helped in providing an outlet for Syria to by-pass Western and Arab sanctions
and allowed credit lines to extend to their country’s ministries and national bank. Iran also
assisted in mobilizing Iraq in helping with the efforts such as establishing financial agreements
within Iraqi banks and trading routes that would facilitate Syria to receive weapons and goods. 49
Tehran also supplied its own uninterrupted flow of weaponry and helped to reorganize Syria’s
military. However, many scholars point to Iran training and developing the National Defense
Force for Syrian support as one of the greatest contributions to the efforts to ensure the survival
of Assad’s regime. In 2012 and 2013 pictures surfaced that shows Iranian units fighting
alongside Syrian forces, proving how utterly involved and committed the Iranian government has
now become in this crisis.

The list goes on regarding the ways in which Iran has become engrossed in this conflict
and while much is still kept quiet about the exact involvements of the Iranian government;
Western intelligence has estimated that about $15-19 billion has been used thus far on direct
assistance to Assad’s regime. 50 However, there is much speculation as to why Iran has put their
own nation at risk and isolated themselves in such a time of strife and delicate negotiation to see
the survival of a decimating state that a majority of Iranians feel indifferent for on their best
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day. 51 In fact, even the Iranian diplomat in charge of Middle Eastern affairs, Hossein Amir
Abdollahian explained that Iran is “not seeking to have Assad remain president for life...” 52 So,
the questions remain, what is the motivation behind allying with a government that is falling and
further alienating your own state from neighbors interested in seeking the definite the demise of
this ally state of yours? Just as intriguing is the how this Syrian Civil War has resulted in the
splitting of decisions within the Iranian government, yet the decision still persists—continue to
supply Assad’s regime with support. Western détente is at its weakest point with Iran due to the
policy choices regarding the Syrian conflict and the nuclear negotiations, however all of these
presumably surmounting costs seem to be petty compared to the benefit that the survival of
Assad’s regime would mean for Iran. This benefit seems to be masked by a myriad of
speculations, but one protrudes like no other is the desire for the Iranian government to be the
prominent state in the Levant region—a primarily Shi’ite society that balances out the
dominating majority Sunni societies of the Middle East. 53 However, even as secular as the Syrian
government attempts to make their state, the rise of radical jihadism and the penetration of this
radical ideology into the borders of Syria has made this Syrian Civil War much more
complicated than it ever intended to be.

Conclusion
Due to the security dilemma between Iran and Saudi Arabia as discussed in this chapter’s
section on nuclear technology, it is quite evident that each state’s domestic policies has the
ability to aggravate the hostility between both states. In this instance, it is Iran’s nuclear
aspirations that have led to a decline in friendly relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. While
Iran claims to lust after nuclear power for peaceful purposes, the Saudi regime has been backed
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into a corner of doubt and fear. The security dilemma is as follows: Iran seeks nuclear
technology and Saudi Arabia—being Iran’s largest adversarial neighbor—is under the
impression that Iran’s policies are offensive in nature. Unfortunately, this takes a spiraling affect
in which Saudi Arabia begins to boost up their military capabilities and the cycle makes a full
circle when Iran then feels threatened by Saudi policies.
Furthermore, the foreign policies that Iran has chosen have had a substantial effect on
Iran-Saudi ties. The section labeled the Syrian Civil War has provided many key details as to the
progression of Iran’s stance in Syria. Subsequently, it is beneficial to note that Iran’s decisions
regarding this state run counter to those that Saudi Arabia proposes. This lack of unification on
such a delicate and timely issue purports the idea that foreign policies are capable of furthering
the hostility between both states.
While religion and ideology seems to affect both states in foreign and domestic policy realms, it
is important to state that this does not necessarily mean that religion and ideology are the only
factors that have created and exacerbated Iran-Saudi hostility. So, while it is neither confirmed
nor denied that Iranian or Saudi foreign and domestic policies have created the rift between these
two, it is understood that the rift is only worsened by policies that are seen as offensive or
unfavorable by either state. Moreover, it cannot be confirmed nor denied that religion and
ideology directly affect the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but each state’s form of law
is directly related to religion, which means that religion has the potential and the ability to
indirectly affect this hostility.
The geography of Iran has played a significant role in shaping the politics of the state.
The country’s entire northern border is shared with countries that were previously part of the
Soviet Union. 54 Iran’s western borders are shared with Turkey and Iraq. The Eastern borders are
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connected with Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the Southern part of Iran is directly connected to
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. All of these borders have influenced the political
approaches taken by the government throughout Iranian history. Moreover, these borders have
affected, in some condition, the way in which the Iranian state has been perceived. For instance,
after the Islamic Revolution took place, surrounding states became uneasy with the idea of an
entire governmental overthrow occurring so close to home.
Similarly, the geographical aspects within Iran itself have shaped the state. Iran is said to
be a fairly mountainous country. The mountain ranges have provided the opportunity for
agricultural and urban growth to sprout due to the way in which the mountains enclose large
areas of water. 55 These mountains also contributed to the way in which Iranian society
functioned before modern technology and roads were established. Before there was access to
trains, cars, and other modes of transportation, the society of Iran was split into different pockets
of communities that were known to be isolated due to the dense mountains. Since there are not
any major river systems in the country transportation was limited and done through the use of
caravans. 56 This foundation of Iranian society had the potential to unevenly develop the nation.
The mountains not only influenced the way in which society grew, but also the economy
of Iran. The mountains inhibited the easy access to the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Thus,
the ranges played a key role in the state’s development of industries that were not incredibly
dependent upon the usage of waterways. During the oil boom, Tehran had realized that it hit the
jackpot. The state began to become dependent on oil money, as with most of the states in this
region. However, similar to the fates of surrounding states, the resources began to dwindle, with
the money following suit. The government had realized in the 1980’s that other industries needed
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to quickly develop. However, major changes to the economy have yet to be seen. The state had
continued on the path of oil-money dependence.
This is why the sanctions imposed by the international community have crippled the
Iranian government. The sanctions have frozen Iranian money and thus, the entire process of oil
development has been ceased, for the most part. The Iranian economy has been known to
be lacking throughout the past few decades, and the implementation of harsh sanctions has
resulted in the worsening of this situation for the entire nation. Furthermore, there is well over
double the amount of people living in Iran than in Saudi Arabia. Saudi oil reserves and revenues
have far surpassed those of Iran. Both states are known to be extremely dependent upon oilmoney. Yet, when comparing these two it becomes clear as to how the entire population and
government of Iran seems to be struggling at a rate that others are not able to fathom. The Saudi
government might be able to rely on oil revenues, for now at least, but the Iranian government is
not able to enjoy that privilege. This is why diversifying the economy and adding new industries
is so vital to the government—the state has more than 83 million citizens to account for.
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CHAPTER THREE: OMAN
Introduction
Oman is known as one of the most neutral states existing in the Middle East. In fact, this
state has been compared to and described as a Switzerland of this region. Many Omani leaders
have attributed their state’s neutrality to the way in which this state practices and incorporates
religion. The state religion of Oman is known as Ibadi, a sect of Islam. However, this particular
sect is practiced differently than the more widely known Sunni and Shi’a branches. One of the
most recognizable aspects of Ibadi Islam is the tolerance of other religions. When residing within
Oman, an individual is allowed to practice any religion that they choose, in fact, in Oman’s
capital there are multiple Christian churches that are situated right beside mosques. This
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picturesque view stands as a strong metaphor for the way in which tolerance is practiced
throughout all of Oman. In a region and world where stability and tolerance seems inexistent,
this state gives hope towards a more positive future in which differences are celebrated, not
attacked.
However, Oman had not always been considered this tolerant, nor was this nation
continuously active throughout the international community. 1 Before the current leader, Sultan
Qaboos bin Said came to power, his father was the ruler of this secluded nation. It was during his
father’s rule that this state refrained from engaging in international affairs and, in some instances,
was considered isolated. 2 Sultan Qaboos wanted to change this—he wanted his country to
participate more throughout international affairs and by instilling a sense of tolerance throughout
the entire state, the Sultan was able to achieve his goals.

For Omani officials, working with their neighbors is at the top of the priority list in order for
stability and openness to be spread throughout the Persian Gulf region. As Sheikh Abdullah Al
Salimi, Oman’s Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs expresses:
Being in this part of the world we feel it is part of our moral mandate to do whatever we
can to maintain peace. If any part of this region goes to war we are all affected. We do
not want that so our efforts and our overriding agenda is to bring about peace in troubled
areas if we can do so, and this has always been the policy of the Sultanate. We believe
there are lots of things that can be worked on to bring peace to all regions of the world
and in trying to help achieve these ends, we are only doing what we are supposed to do,
according to our beliefs and values. 3
Oman-Iran Relations
One of the most interesting examples of displaying Oman’s ability as a neutral state is
comparing the relations that Omani officials had with Iran before and after the Islamic
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Revolution. As previously discussed, the Islamic Revolution completely morphed the Iranian
government; it should be noted that these changes were not merely changes to domestic policies,
but foreign policies as well. After the demise of the Pahlavi regime, Ayatollah Khomeini desired
a state that would stand in stark contrast to the Shah’s Iran. One of the more encompassing
themes of these changes was Khomeini’s aspiration for a state that was pure and independent
from the rest of the world, especially the West—the leader wanted to develop a more selfsustaining, Islamic state. After Khomeini came to power, Iran’s list of allies had a major
makeover—almost all of the states that the Shah had grown cozy with would immediately find
themselves on the long list of adversaries. One notable state that appeared to defy the odds of this
seemingly inevitable outcome was Oman.
In 1970, at the time of the Shah’s rule in Iran, Sultan Qaboos became the leader of Oman.
The Sultan and the Shah had developed a relationship that was considered pleasant and open to
discussion. In fact, in 1972, Qaboos was faced with a substantial rebellion known as the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman—the Sultan had just come into power and the state’s military
was not able to quickly quell the revolts. 4 The Sultan felt that it was necessary to seek external
aid for ceasing the rebellion and had requested the Shah to enter and assist in dispelling the
insurgency. Even though the Shah received many complaints from Arab neighbors, Iranian
forces entered Oman and quickly extinguished the uprisings. 5 In doing so, the Iranian
government had ensured their regional security while also earning the eternal gratitude of the
Omani government. At this point it becomes clear that Oman and the Shah’s Iran had developed
peaceful relations that, at times, led to unequivocal assistance.
Yet, the dynamic between the Sultan and the Shah is not necessarily surprising given
national and regional interests that both states shared. What is surprising is that the Omani
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government managed to continue the peaceful dynamic with Iran. While the relations between
Oman and Iran have fluctuated over time, it is important to note and understand that these
fluctuations have not hindered the ability for peaceful relations to continue and flourish. 6 One of
the more outstanding instances in which this can be articulated is through a discussion of the role
that Oman has played throughout nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West, particularly
the United States.
At the request of American officials, the Omani government has hosted and neutralized
meetings between Tehran and Washington. These meetings were considered top secret and there
is still little known on the specific dealings that have occurred in these ‘backdoor’ gatherings. 7
What is known is that Omani officials had encouraged and facilitated the warming of relations
between Iran and the U.S. especially through the use of negotiating conferences regarding the
Iranian nuclear program. The results of these meetings have resulted in not just direct effects,
such as explicitly warming the relations between Tehran and Washington, but have also
indirectly affected interregional affairs. One of the more indirect and noticeable effects was the
softening of the animosity between Iran and the Sunni Gulf states. This is significant to note
because any nuclear deal brokered between Iran and the UN Security Council essentially
required the Obama administration to convince the surrounding Arab states to agree with the
nuclear deals. 8 If there wasn’t support stemming from the entire Gulf region, then multiple
scenarios could potentially deem the nuclear deals unsuccessful.
However, this isn’t the only instance in which the Omani government had established
itself as a neutral actor in a time of chaos. It seems that Oman has racked up quite an extensive
historical record of asserting its state as one of impartiality and peace. As previously stated, the
warm relations between Muscat and Tehran seemed to have truly flourished when the Shah had
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sent in forces to extinguish the rebellion that threatened the Sultan’s standing. This favor was
intended to secure the stability of both states, and Omani officials further cemented the peaceful
relations by establishing its state as one of the only states that remained neutral throughout the
Iran-Iraq War. As many surrounding states had begun to financially assist Saddam’s efforts in
this insurrection, Sultan Qaboos stood in deep contrast as he established neutrality throughout the
entire conflict. Additionally, the Omani government had paid 1.5 million dollars of bail for the
subsequent release of American hikers whom were detained in Iran in 2011. 9 These are just a
few of many incidences in which Omani officials have proved that their state has the ability to
broker deals and establish itself as one of the most, if not most, neutral states existent within this
region.
The Omani government has realized that they carry an extremely valuable and rare
quality—they have amiable relations with the U.S. and Iran. Even more exceptional is the fact
that Oman is a member of the GCC. Omani officials have enjoyed the opportunity and ability to
remain peaceful with their Gulf neighbors as well as continue friendly relations with the U.S.
This phenomenon is not purely unique to Oman, however this state has developed into one of the
most active international mediators throughout nuclear negotiations. Remarkably, this state has
managed to establish consistent neutrality in a region and time in which tensions and a lack of
stability has manifested into the falling of many influential-neighboring regimes. Even with the
crumbling of these surrounding governments and the worsening of affairs between Saudi Arabia
and Iran, Oman has succeeded in continuing national and regional tolerance and strength. This
seemingly unprecedented feat begs the question of how this was made possible for a state that
was previously isolated from the rest of the world.
For Sheikh Abdullah Al Salimi, the explanation for this question is quite simple:
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As Omanis and Ibadis, we are doing what we are supposed to do in maintaining good
relations with our neighbors. In this part of the world we have Arab neighbors, Indian
neighbors, Persian neighbors and we try - and have always tried - to foster good relations
between all these peoples. If we can help, we are happy to do so but it is not our policy to
interfere in other people's internal affairs and we do not allow other people to interfere in
our own internal affairs. 10

The Minister has explained on numerous occasions that religious practices sincerely
assist in developing peaceful relations with Oman’s neighbors. Along these lines, the Minister
has explicitly stated that the state has a mandate to guide tense situations into an arena of peace.
It is well known that this region is considered one of the more tense regions in the entire world.
Thus, Omani officials have delegated their power and established their standing as neutral actors
in order for peace to be seen throughout this region. It seems that a sense of responsibility had
washed over the Omani government and had resulted in an unrelenting dedication to become not
only a good neighbor, but also an active citizen of the world.
Oman-Saudi Relations
Iran and Oman have seemingly enjoyed good relations since the beginning of Sultan
Qaboo’s rule, however research has provided evidence that suggests the relations between
Muscat and Riyadh have not always been agreeable. After the 1970 coup d’état, the Sultan
insisted on normalizing relations with all neighboring states, including Saudi Arabia. 11 The
Sultan had formally established relations during a 1971 state visit to Riyadh. After this state visit,
the relations between Riyadh and Muscat dramatically improved. A few years after this state
visit, the pressing territorial dispute regarding the Al Buraymi Oasis between the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, and Oman had also been formally dealt with in the form of a treaty. 12 The treaty resulted
in the sharing of villages located in this region between Oman and the UAE. The Saudi
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government was satisfied with this agreement because the UAE would allow Saudi access to the
gulf. Shortly after this issue was resolved, Oman acted as a mediator between Tehran and
Riyadh. Around this same time period, an additional territorial issue regarding the formalization
of the border between Saudi Arabia and Oman had been resolved.
Additionally, Muscat and Riyadh had joined with 4 other gulf states to form the Gulf
Cooperation Council. While the Omani and Saudi governments have not agreed on every issue
that has come about since the formalizing of relations, it is important to note these instances in
which unprecedented cooperation between these two states had resulted in the improvement of
regional relations.
Clearly, Sultan Qaboos did not desire to establish relations with only the Iranian
government. Muscat has intentionally and strategically befriended many surrounding states and
Oman has managed to form close ties with the Saudi government as well. Due to the status quo
of this area of the world, it seems very unlikely that a state would develop close relations with
both sides of the bipolar Gulf region. Nevertheless, the Omani government is known to not only
work in accordance with Tehran, but also Riyadh. While Iran and Oman share mutual interests
such as ensuring security and vitality of the Gulf of Oman and establishing economic ties, Oman
has also been noted to share economic, social, and political interests with Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, these two states share a border, which must be accounted for due to geopolitical
issues.
In order to speculate the implications and reasons for many decisions made by Saudi
Arabia, it is vital to understand the geography, as well as political atmosphere of this region.
When studying a map of the Gulf region while integrating the understanding of relations and
internal politics of each state, it becomes clear that Saudi Arabia has begun to slowly face a
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dilemma. This dilemma is related to the idea that Saudi Arabia seems to be gradually engulfed
by a region in which friendly relations are difficult to keep and regime takeovers are the norm.
As previously discussed in the Saudi Arabia case study, the Saudi government has intended to
keep their state as stable as possible, and they have more or less succeeded for many decades.
However, currently, it is in the best interest of Riyadh to assert itself as a strong and able state,
while attempting to establish good relations among neighbors, even if this means to compromise
on certain issues. This balance relies solely on the ability for Saudi officials to walk a fine line
between too much and too little. Yet, Saudi Arabia is not alone in fearing the developments of
tensions throughout this region--every Gulf state has its own unique fears in regards to the
tension. In fact, most members of this community had come together in May of 1981 to form a
committee that would unite and supply outlets for answers to difficult situations. This group is
known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). With exception to Iraq, all Arab-Gulf states are
members of this council, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, and Qatar. This organization was founded under the intention for these 6 member states
to unite on economic fronts. However, the actions and involvements of the GCC have surpassed
merely ensuring economic stability. The GCC meets on a number of occasions to discuss, among
other things, the security of the region and strengthening the relations between each nation.
The GCC intends to unify the Gulf States and desires to ensure that there is a level of
responsibility as well as security throughout this region. While not all decisions have been made
unilaterally, it is significant to note that the GCC allows for intercommunication between all
members. This is a luxury of the alliance between Oman and Saudi Arabia that the Iranian
government does not have.
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Conclusion
These events and scenarios that place the Omani government in the regional position it
currently is in are not mere coincidences. Ever since obtaining power in 1970, Sultan Qaboos has
managed to make every decision with future implications in mind. This has led to the creation of
a state that has established its independence and ability as well as established its moral
obligations as a citizen of the Persian Gulf region. The mediation of nuclear negotiations and the
ability to warm the ties between Iran and the surrounding Arab-gulf states has proven to be one
of many situations that the Omani government has been able to handle.
Not only does this state recognize its valuable ability as a mediator, but it has also
understood its role as a provider for its own citizens. The Omani government has come to realize
that religious tolerance is key to establishing peace—inside and outside of their borders. There
are indications that because Oman’s state religion is of a different sect than Sunni or Shi’a, the
government does not feel compelled to actively engage or take a firm stance on the sectarian
conflicts throughout this region.
State officials have expressed that through Ibadi Islam and the integration of this sect into
the government and culture of this state, tolerance on a national, regional, and global scale has
been achieved. This state’s practices can be used as an example throughout the entire world,
especially in situations that are as tense as the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Oman had faced decades of isolation from international affairs. Some scholars have
attributed this isolation to two factors: geography and politics. Before the 1970s, the leader of
Oman had intended for the state to become secluded due to a desire of independence. Said
bin Taimur insisted on raising his country in the same manner that he raised his son: in isolation.
Soon after Said bin Taimur’s son, Qaboos ibn Said had become educated in Britain, Said
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bin Taimur had faced the ultimate dilemma of his life. Qaboos intended to overthrow his father
and become the Sultan of Oman. It wasn’t until Sultan Qaboos came to power that the state
began programs that would integrate Oman within regional and global relations.
Yet, the political process that the Omani state endured throughout the past decades isn’t
the only factor contributing to isolation. The physical geography of Oman and the surrounding
region is said to be another attribute. Oman is situated on the southeastern tip of the Arabian
Peninsula. While it shares borders with the UAE, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, a majority of the
Omani perimeter is linked to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. The border that Oman
shares with Saudi Arabia is connected to the Saudi Arabia’s most intense desert—it is known
that there are not many, if any, inhabitants that live in this region of Saudi Arabia. In fact, the
majority of the population of Oman lives along the coast and in major metropolitan cities near
the coast. This is because of the type of industry that was developed within Oman when the state
was formed. A majority of the resources are located along the coast and the waterways provided
the opportunities for Oman to trade and connect with the rest of the world.
After some time, these connections provided Oman with the ability to become stable and
independent all while developing the economy of the state. The oil boom within the Middle East
had peaked at a vital time for the Omani government. It was during this time that the state began
to contribute to the growing trend of globalization. Oman was known to be one of
the many states within the region that benefited from the oil market due to the oil supplies that
the state sat on. So, Muscat was able to enjoy some of the spoils that oil money brought.
Recently, however, the government has become too reliant upon this type of revenue and, the
Omani government is looking into diversifying the economy. Some of these tactics include:
focusing on tourism and developing more gas-based industries. The ultimate goal of the Omani
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government is to reduce the amount GDP that the oil industry is bringing in from 46% to 9% by
the year 2020. 13
Thus, while politics played a key role in the development of the Omani state, it is
important to note that geography plays a vital role as well. Geography is known to impact almost
every aspect of a state including: society, economy, and politics. Currently, Sultan Qaboos is
working towards regional and global integration—continuing his agenda and legacy from when
he first came to power. The Sultan is well acquainted with the limitations that Omani political
history and geographical aspects have placed on his state. The development of technology that
makes it increasingly easier for people and states to connect has led to many different
opportunities for the state. Some of these opportunities have developed into scenarios in which
the Omani government is able to provide a unique resource to the region and the world:
negotiation tactics.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this discussion was to explore the relations between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. After performing this research, it was found that these two states have a long history of
hostile ties. Although, there were some years where the regional environment gave way to
cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh, these years are not considered to be an accurate
rendition of the overall relations. In order to dig deeper into what caused this hostility and what
events have exacerbated it, this research required an analysis regarding the major facets of each
state. The varying factors that were evaluated were the leadership, national/domestic security,
regional stability, and integration of Islam in government. These factors will be discussed in
further detail at a later point in this chapter.
When evaluating Saudi Arabia, it was found that the government’s form of Wahhabi
Islam has greatly influenced the society and the relations that the state has with neighboring
states.
While the Saudi government has strived to maintain stability since the beginnings of the
al-Saud monarchy, the Iranian government has changed dramatically over the past few decades.
One of the most important and far-reaching changes happened after the 1979. This year not only
marked a change for Iran, but its neighbors as well. Before 1979, when the Shah was in power,
Tehran enjoyed friendly relations with western states. After the fall of the Shah, and during the
time in which Ayatollah Khomeini was in charge, Tehran had made some major modifications:
the state became more isolated and no longer had warm relations with the western hemisphere.
This would complete change the way in which Iran was viewed across the entire world.
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One divergence was the way in which Tehran postulated itself. Ayatollah Khomeini had
decided to articulate Iranian authority by claiming to be the only true and pure Islamic state. This
was clearly perceived as offensive in the eyes of the al-Saud monarchy, which had claimed the
title of the only pure Islamic state a long time ago. Since the rise of Khomeini, the relations
between Tehran and Riyadh had, for the most part, completed plummeted. Thus, for the sake of
this discussion, the 1979 Islamic Revolution is considered the root of the current relations
between these two states. However, there is another aspect that has been little touched on
throughout political literature regarding the effect of the Revolution on Saudi Arabia.
Besides the obvious declaration that Tehran broadcasted throughout the world regarding
their status, there lies another, almost invisible point of tension. States, like biological specimen,
have instinctual and major goals. One central goal that is shared amongst animals, plants, people,
and states is the desire to survive. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seems to be a perfect example
of this goal. While monarchs have come and gone, the same family has been governing the
Kingdom for decades. In fact, the policies and laws have more or less stayed the same. There is
clear evidence stipulating that Riyadh attempts to combat instability on an everyday basis.
However, this is not a profound discovery; as articulated earlier: all states attempt to remain
alive. What is distinctive regarding the circumstances surrounding Riyadh is that this state has
been severely affected by the instability of the entire region, and this is not limited to current
events. The Islamic Revolution in Iran stood as a personal symbol of warning in the eyes of the
Saudi monarchy. The King and his men had witnessed the rise and fall of a state that was
seemingly strong for many years. If a state as developed and strong as Iran could crumble in the
matter of a few years, couldn’t the Kingdom see the same fate? The citizens of Saudi Arabia
were able to see what the Iranian citizens were able to accomplish. Could they not get rebellious
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ideas of their own? Additionally, the blow that Riyadh received personally from Tehran
regarding the purity of Islam seemed to completely undermine the authority of the King. In Saudi
Arabia, the King and the ruling al-Saud monarchy has a mandate from God to govern the citizens
of the Kingdom. So, when Khomeini asserts that his state is the only true and pure Islamic state,
he is negating the authority that the Saudi king has. After all of these components are mixed
together, it becomes quite evident as to why the Saudi leadership has seemed almost paralyzed in
fear. This explains why the government has combated modernization, rebellion, and regional
instability at such an intensive level. This state has been surrounded by threats since the 1979
Islamic Revolution, and it has only grown more severe.
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Figure 5 Shows the various levels of interaction of the comparative factors within each state.

The three case studies that were analyzed were Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. It was
found that there were striking similar factors that were explored throughout each case study.
These factors are the leadership, national and domestic security, regional stability, and
integration of Islam in government. The section below is a closer examination on these factors
throughout each case study.
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Throughout the phase of research on Iran it was found that there have been many influential
leaders scattered through Iranian history. However, the leaders that attributed to a majority of the
relations between Tehran and Riyadh and Tehran and Muscat were the Shah of Iran and
Ayatollah Khomeini. These two leaders had opposite policy-tracks and were known for their
complete opposition.
The Shah was known for his desire to remain friendly with the Western hemisphere. In
fact, during and after the fall of the Shah’s influence, he had received cancer treatment in a
hospital in New York. On the other hand, the Shah was also known for establishing and
maintaining, or at least attempting to maintain good relations with neighbors in the region. Of
those neighbors, one in particular had enjoyed the good-natured relations with the Shah: Oman.
Unfortunately, these types of international and interregional affairs developed into reasons for
Iranian citizens to overthrow the throne. On the journey towards becoming the United States’ top
partner within the Persian Gulf region, the Shah had managed to isolate his own constituency.
Whether this was an unfortunate by-product of attempting to ensure security for Iran or this was
intentional neglect, is not relevant. What is important to note is that the Shah was attempting to
fundamentally change parts of Iranian government and society that were not ready to change at
the time. The Shah was establishing a state in which government and religion were separate and
this led to a spiraling chain of events. The secular nature of Iran and the subsequent tightening of
relations with the West had left the citizens of Iran in a frightened and frenzied state of mind.
This frenzy allowed the formerly exiled religious leader, Ruhollah Khomeini to reach and
comfort the citizens on a level that the Shah had not been able to achieve.
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The rising action before the Islamic Revolution climax consisted of the Shah managing to
worsen his status, as well as increase the likelihood for a leader like Khomeini to establish a
concrete foothold within the state. The creation of the SAVAK was initially needed to enforce
the modern laws that the Shah had set in place. However as the tide worsened, the organization
was soon established as the general policing agency and its enforcing tactics were infamous for
being brutal and extremely forceful.
The medley of events and actions taken by the Shah had developed into full outrage and
created the perfect environment for a leader to surface. While Khomeini soon filled that role, the
situation in Iran was so delicate that it has been suggested that any leader that preached
ideologies opposite to those of the Shah would have developed into the leader of Iran.
Subsequently, the path that the Iranian government and society took after the Islamic Revolution
stood in stark opposition to the former path of the Shah. It seemed that everything had changed
in light of this Revolution—the constitution and laws, the way of life, the government style, etc.
Khomeini had managed to develop Iran into an Islamic state in every aspect of the title. This also
leads to the complication of relations between Tehran and neighboring states. However, the
cooling of relations is attributed to other aspects of Khomeini’s policy choices as well.
If the Shah was known for his aspirations of friendly relations within the region and
across the world, Khomeini’s response was identical to most of his actions in contrast with the
Shah: opposite. The Ayatollah desired a state that was independent from outside influences—the
desire was for the Islamic Republic of Iran would be, for the most part, self-sufficient and to be
viewed at as a powerful state. Consequently, most of the resources and effort that the Shah had
poured into guaranteeing that certain states remained on the better side of Iran would go to waste
when Khomeini gained influence. As far as the Ayatollah was concerned, there was neither need
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nor desire to be cozy with the United States—the U.S. only wanted to use Iranian influence in
the region and develop the state into one of secular nature.
Eventually, the newfound desire for the state to become independent would become the
hallmark for decisions down the road. For instance, there is a clear connection between the lust
for self-sufficiency and independently ensuring the protection of the state. No longer did the
Iranian government feel it was safe to rely on other states for security or protection. In this sense,
some of the Iranian political maneuvers that are witnessed in the late 20th and early 21st century
have root in Khomeini’s domestic and foreign policy choices. Through analyzing a chain of
events beginning with the Islamic Revolution, it becomes evident as to why the Iranian
government had worked so hard to establish nuclear technology.
While it is only speculated whether the nuclear aspirations within Tehran were for
peaceful purposes or not, either answer helps to explain the desire for independence within this
region. It is not farfetched to speculate that Iran’s nuclear intentions were due to the need to
develop an energy supply that would stabilize the state. It is well known that as a world, we are
using oil much faster than it can be reproduced, therefore there will come a time in which
generating energy from oil cannot be relied on. On the other hand, if the Iranian government
intended to generate nuclear technology for the purpose of creating a nuclear weapon, it could
also explain how far the desire for independence has gone. Continuing on with the legacy that
Khomeini left, Ali Khamenei had managed to formulate policies that would push Iran closer to
the brink of self-sufficiency. Although, globalization is said to have taken a strong hold across
international affairs, the Iranian state has put up a good fight. It seems that the lust for a state that
does not rely on others’ for security or supplies is stronger than the trends of globalization would
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have predicted. Thus, the discussion of Tehran’s nuclear aspirations has developed into one of
the most important topics regarding this region.
The Iranian nuclear program has become a problem not just for the state, but for
neighboring states as well, especially for Saudi Arabia. The idea of Saudi’s number one rival
attaining capacity for a nuclear weapon has sparked fear, once again, in the eyes of the
monarchy. However, it isn’t just the situation inside Iranian borders that has worried the Saudi
leadership, it’s also the policies that the Iranian government as enacted in accordance with global
headliners—such as the Syrian Civil War.
As discussed in previous chapters, the Iranian government has guaranteed assistance to
Bashar al-Assad and his regime. While Iran is not the only state that has assisted the Assad
regime, the state is one of the most substantial providers of assistance. In fact, on several
occasions there have been sightings of Iranian soldiers fighting alongside Syrian loyalists. These
efforts go directly against the efforts of the Saudi leadership. Riyadh has increased the
aggression towards ensuring that Assad’s regime falters and Tehran is in the way of that ultimate
goal. Saudi Arabia has not only become the leader of the coalition against Assad, but this state
has also provided funding and even physical support through the use of air strikes. This is why
the Syrian Civil War is notoriously known as a proxy-war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The
inter-conflict hostility between these states has exacerbated the fight between Syrian citizens and
their government.
Yet, there has been another effect of this proxy-war: the rise of the world’s most
infamous terrorist organization, ISIS. In this instance, Saudi efforts regarding this war have
created a gap within the society that became the perfect breeding ground for extremism. The
blame shouldn’t be placed all on the Saudi monarchy—there are a multitude of actors involved
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in the chain of events leading to this ultimate environment. However, the Saudi government had
realized that their choices would support the rise of extremism pockets. After much analysis, the
leadership had come to the conclusion that the objective was worth the risk. Thus, the Syrian
Civil War became the perfect example of how the game of politics is a game best played by
opportunists. In some cases, the fighting between different actors has managed to drown out the
fundamental fighting. Syrian citizens are left fleeing the country as terror and mass chaos has
taken over their precious homeland. Saudi’s efforts of aiding the Free Syrian Army have only
worsened the status of this delicate nation. While the ultimate goal might have revolved around
ensuring that Iranian influence does not spread throughout the region and thus ensuring that
Assad’s regime falls, the Saudi leadership has become a lead developer of a massive security
problem.
It has been mentioned on more than one occasion that the al-Saud monarchy has been
combating instability for decades. In fact, one of the reasons why the first Saudi state failed was
because of domestic instability. As if the leadership had learned its eternal lesson, the state has
become one of the more stable states existing within the region. When looking at a map of the
Persian Gulf and Levantine region, it becomes apparent that almost every state surrounding
Saudi Arabia has been inflicted with instability at one time or another. It’s as if the Saudi
leadership has been backed into a tight corner and each time a policy fails or a nation falls to
instability, the corner becomes smaller. The fight against this tightening corner has been the
inheritance of each Saudi King when he is given the throne.
This feeling of being cornered has been affected by and effects more than just regional
events; the Saudi government has developed domestic issues and policies that directly relate to
the threat of instability. Islamic fundamentalism is a national issue for Saudi Arabia because of
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the amount of extremists that originate from this country. In order to ensure stability within the
state, the leadership has developed policies of combating internal extremism, protecting key
borders, and ensuring that modernization does not seep in through the walls.
Although these efforts seem harmless and proactive, some policy decisions that have
roots in these efforts have an effect opposite of the one desired. In order to examine this
properly, it must be noted that the Saudi government relies on a Wahhabi code of law. This is
one of the more strict forms of governmental Sunni Islam and has even been described as
extreme in some instances. The Wahhabi movement within Saudi Arabia gave rise to a
governmental system that insisted on continuing to practice law and religion in a fundamental
way. In essence, Wahhabism targets modernization, as any sign of the creation of a new system
would be seen as a threat to fundamental Islam. In this way, some of the policy choices and laws
that encompass the state might seem a little “outdated” or “old fashioned.” One such law is the
banning of driving for women. This has seen outrage and defiance, and has developed into a
fight regarding modernization between the citizens and the leadership.
Additionally, the Saudi government has received opposition from another sect of the
nation as well. The Saudi citizens whom practice Shi’ite Islam are noted as feeling discriminated
against through governmental and societal outlets. There are indications that the government
supplies more resources towards those who are faithful to Sunni Islam. However, the source of
the discrimination is not only the government, but also how society acts towards those of another
branch of Islam. Those who do not practice Islam accordingly or go against the norms provided
by the Saudi leadership will not been accepted by the government or society. These internal
issues have resulted in international and regional badgering due to the globalization of news.
Leaders and citizens from across the world have voiced their opinion regarding Saudi
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discrimination. As the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia governs the two Islamic Holy cities as well as
oversees the happenings of the Hajj, governments and people from differing states have
established that the discrimination should not be tolerated. This is yet another point of contention
between Riyadh and capitals across the world, especially Tehran.
Yet, there is a state that has maintained warm relations with and between Arabia and Iran.
Throughout all of the conflicts and issues described earlier, the Sultanate of Oman has played a
background role. In order to explain this role in more detail, a discussion must be held regarding
the leadership of this state.
As in the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the leadership has always been an outlet for
analysis and a root for understanding the state as a whole. For Oman, the leadership and change
in leadership are factors that are helpful in analysis due to the ability to provide a comprehensive
chain of events. Before Sultan Qaboos came to power, his father, Said bin Taimur led the state.
However, this succession was not seen as cooperative in nature--Said bin Taimur was
overthrown and his son began to lead the state in a direction opposite of his father.
Since 1970, Qaboos had developed a state in which tolerance was the hallmark of each
decision. The Sultan has established that all religions are accepted within the borders of Oman.
In a region that is heavily dominated by Islam and tension between sects, the establishment of
tolerance regarding religion is significant, to say the least. Key leaders of this state have provided
reason as to why Oman practices tolerance at such a high level and the reason lies in the religion
of the state. The government has asserted that Ibadi Islam is the reason for the national, regional,
and global tolerance. This tolerance has allowed Oman to mold into the role of a neutral
negotiator throughout the region. Sultan Qaboos has established his neutrality between Iran and
Saudi Arabia on many occasions. Oman is a founding member of the GCC and continues to
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serve as a financial and trading partner with Tehran in accordance to the sharing of the Gulf of
Oman.
The Minister of Religion and Affairs within Oman has acknowledged that Muscat
attempts to stay out of other states’ relations and domestic affairs. In this way, Oman considers
itself as neutral state, however when Muscat’s services are requested in regards to acting as a
negotiator. This role has proved to empower the state within regional and international affairs.
The Omani government has provided the world with an example of how a change in leadership
could allow a previously isolated state to become one of the world’s leading negotiators.
Throughout most of the conflicts that plague this region, Oman’s skills and status have
the potential to relieve some pressure. This is significant because some of the tension throughout
regional relations has incapacitated states to merely sit at the same table, nevertheless come to
compromising. The Omani government has the ability and tactics to open up the table for states-such as Saudi Arabia and Iran--to discuss key issues.
This research was conducted in order to answer a few questions regarding the relations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Among those questions, this discussion intended to answer or at
least narrow down the possibilities of the roots of the hostility between these two states.
Additionally, this research provided analysis regarding the factors that appear to be worsening
the hostile and fragile ties. This analysis was compiled with information regarding the potential
for cooperation through the use of a neutral negotiating state. In essence, the results of this
research have provided outlets and understandings of not only the political history of and
between these states, but it has also provided an avenue for further discussion on future
prospects.
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Throughout the entirety of this research, a multitude of questions have surfaced. It is
quite common for other questions to appear throughout the research process, as it is not
reasonable to attempt to answer all relevant questions regarding a topic. This seems especially
true throughout the research of international relations because it is not an exact science; it is
ever-changing and dependent upon many different dynamic environments. Thus, this research
should be continued in order for the results to be tailored in accordance with the dynamic
political environment existent at the time. The nature of this research aligns with the nature of
international relations. This topic is of great importance in the 21st century, and the trend of
current international and interregional relations seems to indicate that the significance of this
research is constantly increasing.
The next phase of research concerning this topic should encompass the idea of
establishing what to do from here. The intelligence is available regarding the role each state
plays, the decisions that have made the hostility worse, and the status of each state within the
region. This region is difficult to discuss because of the mass amount of actors, conflicts,
policies, and so on. This research has provided key details regarding two of the more influential
states of this region. In this sense, this area could be considered a bipolar region, with Iran and
Saudi Arabia on either side. While conflicts are escalating and tensions are worsening, the
research purported has provided information that could be used to deescalate issues and possibly
reverse the hostility.
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